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ARTICLE
FISCAL FEDERALISM  AND THE DEDUCTIBILITY  OF
STATE AND LOCAL TAXES UNDER THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX
Louis Kaplow*
Whether state and local taxes are deductible is believed to have impor-
tant effects  on revenue, tax equity, and the operation of state and local
governments.  This Article's analysis of deductibility draws on previous
work that addresses the fiscal activity of state and local governments in
order  to examine the incidence of both taxes and the benefits they finance.
The desirability  of deductibility is assessed not only by reference to whether
it is required  by a conceptually pure income tax but also in terms of how
it serves the underlying objectives of the income tax.  The results of this
investigation contradict many of the arguments offered by advocates and
opponents of deductibility.
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INTRODUCTION
EaDERAL income tax'  deductibility of state and local taxes
1'  paid by individuals2 purportedly generated a revenue loss of
forty billion  dollars  in fiscal year  1995.3  Of the primary  state
and local  revenue  sources,  income  and property taxes  are  de-
ductible (by itemizers4) whereas  sales taxes  are not.5  Whether
I Analysis for a consumption  (or cash flow) tax would be similar, although  differ-
ences  in  the treatment  of housing purchases  may  be relevant  to treatment  of the
property  tax.  See,  e.g., David  F. Bradford  & the U.S.  Treasury  Tax Policy  Staff,
Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 105  (2d ed. 1984).
2 I.R.C. §  164 (1994).  Businesses deduct state and local taxes as an ordinary busi-
ness expense.  I.R.C.  § 162.  Unless  otherwise indicated,  this Article  refers only  to
personal  deductions  for  state and  local taxes.  Part  III  addresses  some  aspects  of
business deductions.  Foreign taxes are also deductible, I.R.C.  § 164(a), and may be
subject to a tax credit, I.R.C. § 901; foreign taxes raise problems of intergovernmental
relations (analogous to the issue of how one state's taxes should be treated by another
state)  rather than the vertical problems (national government  versus state or local)
that are addressed  here.
3 See Office  of Management  & Budget, Executive  Office of the President of the
U.S.,  Budget of the U.S. Government:  Analytical  Perspectives,  Fiscal Year  1995, 56
(Table 6-1)  (1994).  To the extent  deductibility  affects  the types  of state and local
taxes employed, however, eliminating deductibility would raise less revenue than such
static budget estimates indicate.  See George R. Zodrow, Eliminating State and Local
Tax Deductibility: A General Equilibrium Model of Revenue Effects, in Fiscal Feder-
alism: Quantitative Studies 177 (Harvey S. Rosen ed., 1988)  (stating that substitution
among taxes used would result in significantly less revenue than Treasury estimates);
Martin S. Feldstein & Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Effect of Federal Tax Deductibility  on
State and Local Taxes and Spending,  95 J. Pol. Econ. 710 (1987)  (stating that due to
possible shift  in types of taxes used,  eliminating  deductibility  may raise little or no
revenue).  But see Douglas Holtz-Eakin  & Harvey S.  Rosen, Tax Deductibility  and
Municipal Budget Structure, in Fiscal Federalism, supra, at 107 (stating that removing
deductibility  would cause significant  fall in collections  of deductible  taxes and  local
spending and stating that there is no significant evidence of tax substitution mitigating
resulting increase in federal tax revenue); Lawrence B. Lindsey, Federal Deductibility
of State and Local Taxes: A Test of Public Choice by Representative Government, in
Fiscal Federalism,  supra,  at 137  (stating that state  and  local spending  significantly
affected  by deductibility).  For further discussion and evidence, see infra note 206.
4 See I.R.C.  §§  62, 63(d)  (1994).  The analysis  focuses  on whether,  in principle,
there should  be  a deduction.  Whether  the  deduction should  be  available  only  to
itemizers  is  an  administrative  concern that will  not be considered  here.  See  Louis
Kaplow, The Standard  Deduction  and Floors  in the Income Tax, 50 Tax L. Rev.  1
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state and local taxes are deductible is believed to have important
effects  on revenue,  tax equity, and the  operation  of state  and
local governments.  Untangling and assessing these effects have
proved  difficult.  As  a result, the desirability of the deduction
remains controversial.  Many tax reform proposals would elimi-
nate the deduction.6
This Article provides a framework to assess whether individu-
als should be allowed to deduct  state and local  taxes in deter-
mining their taxable income under the federal income tax.  The
Article focuses on what rules provide the most accurate  income
measurement,  and  it also  discusses  efficiency  considerations.7
The analysis differs from most prior work8 in three ways.  First,
(1994).  When  the  deduction  is  limited  to  itemizers,  its distributive,  subsidy,  and
incentive effects will differ, as discussed infra notes 196 and 199 and in Section VI.B.
5  I.R.C. § 164(a)  (1994).  Prior to the 1986 tax reform, sales taxes were deductible.
6  For example, the important Treasury Department study Blueprints for Basic Tax
Reform, released  in 1977, recommended retaining the deductibility of state and l6cal
income taxes but not of sales or property taxes.  Bradford & the U.S. Treasury Tax
Policy Staff, supra note 1, at 83-86.  (For discussion  of why  sales and income  taxes
were to be treated differently, see infra note 147.)  Subsequent Treasury Department
proposals called for the elimination  of the personal deduction for all state and local
taxes.  See  1 U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity,  and Eco-
nomic Growth,  at 78-81 (1984) [hereinafter Treasury  1], 2 id. at 62-68; The President's
Tax  Proposals  to  the  Congress for  Fairness,  Growth,  and Simplicity  62-69  (1985)
[hereinafter Treasury Il]; see also Bruce Bartlett, The Case for Eliminating Deductibil-
ity of State and Local Taxes, 28 Tax Notes 1121  (1985).  The approach advocated  by
the Treasury has been criticized.  See, e.g.,  Brookes D. Billman, Jr. & Noel  B. Cun-
ningham,  Nonbusiness  State  and Local  Taxes: The  Case  for Deductibility,  28  Tax
Notes  1107 (1985); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes:
Income Measurement, Tax Expenditures and Partial, Functional Deductibility, 6 Am.
J. Tax Pol. 9 (1987). The resulting compromise in 1986 was to eliminate deductibility
only for sales taxes. In the current session of Congress, major tax reform is again being
actively discussed, and some prominent proposals would eliminate individuals' ability
to deduct state and local taxes.  See, e.g., USA Tax System, 66 Tax Notes 1481,  1523
(Special Supp. 1995); see also id. at 1548 (proposed elimination of business deduction
for many state and local taxes).
7  The revenue cost of deductibility  is its most salient feature, but tax rates can be
adjusted in an offsetting manner, leaving the appropriate relative treatment of taxpay-
ers who pay differing amounts  of state and local taxes as the central question.  See
infra note 30.  Indeed, proposed  and actual  elimination of deductibility of state and
local taxes were to provide much of the revenue for tax reform that was contemplated
and implemented in the 1980s, with the revenue used to fund lower rates  (in a pur-
portedly distribution-neutral manner).  See also infra text accompanying note 198.  (In
addition, effects on work incentives  are similar, because deductibility lowers the effec-
tive combined marginal rates of state and local taxes.)
8 See, e.g.,  sources cited  supra note 6.
416
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tax  policy  arguments  are  grounded  more  directly  in  modem
incidence  analysis.9  Second, more attention is devoted to what
is financed  by state and local taxes.10  Third, the desirability  of
deductibility  is  assessed  not only by reference  to whether  it is
required by a conceptually  pure income tax but also in terms  of
how it serves underlying objectives  of the income  tax."
Commentators  increasingly  agree  that  an  important  factor
bearing on the appropriateness  of deductibility is whether indi-
viduals'  state  and local tax payments  are closely related to the
public services that individuals  receive.  Some suggest that the
match is  good,  so that state  and  local  taxes can  be viewed  as
payments for government  services.  Just  as individuals are not
permitted to deduct expenditures on ordinary consumption, they
should receive no deduction for consumption purchased through
the government;  hence, state and local taxes should not be de-
ductible.  Others  question the  connection  between  taxes  paid
9 See, e.g., Local Provision of Public Services: The Tiebout Model After Twenty-
five Years (George R. Zodrow ed.,  1983);  Peter Mieszkowski & George R. Zodrow,
Taxation  and  the Tiebout Model: The Differential Effects  of Head Taxes, Taxes on
Land Rents, and Property Taxes,  27 J. Econ. Lit. 1098 (1989);  Robert W. Wassmer,
Property  Taxation,  Property  Base,  and  Property  Value:  An Empirical  Test  of the
"New View,"  46 Nat'l Tax J. 135 (1993).  For a survey covering these and other issues
relevant to fiscal federalism, see Richard A. Musgrave  & Peggy B. Musgrave, Public
Finance  in Theory  and Practice chs. 27-29  (5th ed. 1989),  Wallace  E. Oates,  Fiscal
Federalism  (1979),  David E. Wildasin, Urban  Public Finance  (1986),  and  Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, The Economics of the Local Public Sector, in 2 Alan J. Auerbach & Martin
Feldstein,  Handbook of Public Economics  ch. 11  (1987).  Although the literature  on
local public finance rarely receives extensive attention in legal publications, there are
exceptions.  See, e.g., Robert P. Inman & Daniel  L. Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit
of Local Fiscal  Equity, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1662 (1979).
10  Zelinsky,  supra note 6, devotes substantial  attention to this issue as well as  the
next, although his approach  is quite different from that here, as discussed  infra note
27.
11  A growing literature has emphasized the importance of basing arguments directly
on the objectives of the tax system rather than simply invoking conceptual definitions
of income.  See,  e.g.,  Thomas  D.  Griffith,  Should  "Tax Norms"  Be  Abandoned?
Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis and the Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 1993
Wisc.  L. Rev.  1115;  Thomas  D.  Griffith,  Theories  of Personal  Deductions  in the
Income Tax, 40 Hastings L.J.  343 (1989)  [hereinafter Griffith, Personal  Deductions];
Louis  Kaplow,  Human  Capital  Under  an Ideal  Income  Tax,  80  Va.  L. Rev.  1477
(1994);  Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and Medical
Expense  Deductions  and the Exclusion  of Medical Insurance  Premiums, 79  Cal.  L.
Rev. 1485  (1991); Joseph E. Stiglitz & Michael J. Boskin, Impact of Recent Develop-
ments  in Public Finance Theory on Public Policy Decisions, 67 Am. Econ. Rev. 295
(1977).
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and benefits received.  If state and local taxes are contributions
to government that hardly correlate with benefits received, such
taxes should be deductible.  Part I considers these two cases as
benchmarks for further analysis.  This Part suggests that proper
income measurement when taxes do not equal benefits is achiev-
ed in a manner different from providing deductibility.
Part I also assesses arguments about deductibility by reference
to the ultimate  objectives the federal income  tax serves.  Most
of the analysis in this Article and much in the literature address
whether deductibility is appropriate to implement a conceptually
pure tax on "income."  Presumably, most references to "income"
contemplate some notion of ability to pay: Is an individual who
earns  $30,000  and pays  $1,000  in  state  and local  taxes  in the
same situation  as one who pays no such tax and earns  $30,000,
$29,000, or some other amount?  Part I suggests that arguments
for  adjusting  income  measurement  in light  of state  and  local
taxes depend on premises and arguments that often are rejected
in other contexts.12
Part II examines the process by which particular distributions
of taxes  and benefits arise.13  The  analysis emphasizes  that the
levels  and composition  of both taxes  and benefits  are endoge-
nous:  they are  determined  by individuals'  locational  decisions
and by local government politics.  In addition, the incidence  of
taxes is not always obvious.  The "benefit view" of the property
tax, for example, holds that the tax is borne by residents in an
amount  reflecting  governmental  benefits,  whereas  the  "new
view"  holds that, on  average,  the property tax  is borne  by all
capital.14  Even within the new view, however, it still is possible
12  A  definitive resolution  of the issue  is  difficult  and  beyond  the scope  of the
present investigation.  The relevance  of much of the analysis  in the remainder of the
Article, however, depends upon the position one takes on this issue.  For example, an
argument that a particular tax on business may have  an incidence that results in de
facto  deductibility  to individuals  would  be no  cause  for concern  if  deductibility  is
favored but provides a justification for new rules if it is not.
13  The discussion draws  on a body of theoretical  and empirical  literature-much
concerning the property tax-that addresses the incidence of taxes and benefits.  See,
e.g.,  sources cited supra note  9.
14  The traditional, classical,  or "old"  view that the property tax is borne by occu-
pants of housing is related  to aspects of the new view.  In particular, as explained  in
Subsection  II.B.1,  the new view holds that differences in tax rates between jurisdic-
tions will produce differences in rental prices.  See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., The
418 [Vol. 82:413
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that taxes  equal benefits.  And when  they do  not, accurate in-
come measurement may entail a set of deductions (and imputa-
tions of income) that would be the same for renters (who implic-
itly pay the taxes through higher rents)  as for owner-occupiers.
Part III examines state and local taxes on business, which are
deductible  as ordinary business  expenses.15  Many taxes nomi-
nally imposed on businesses might in fact be borne by consumers
or workers.  To the extent such taxes finance benefits for those
individuals, the appropriateness of business deductibility requires
further analysis.  Relatedly, some taxes will have the same inci-
dence regardless of whether they are imposed nominally on busi-
nesses  or on  individuals.  In  such cases,  the  availability  of de
facto deductibility  under current and most proposed rules may
depend on how states and localities  choose to describe  a given
tax.
Part IV focuses on income redistribution undertaken by state
and local governments.  Redistribution is involved whenever the
state and local taxes that individuals pay do not equal the bene-
fits they receive.16  The analysis in Parts I and II, as well as that
in the literature, assumes that such redistribution  affects ability
to pay  and thus  should be  reflected  in  taxable income,  as  by
allowing deductibility of state and local taxes.  Part IV examines
whether this conclusion follows; the reasoning depends  on why
states and localities in a federal system engage in redistribution.
Part V considers the existence of interjurisdictional spillovers
from state and local activity and their relevance to deductibility.
(Redistribution, the subject of Part IV, is an important potential
source  of spillovers.)
If the analysis  in Parts IV and V provides  some support for
deductibility, it is primarily because deductibility subsidizes  de-
sirable expenditures.  Part VI briefly considers whether deduct-
ibility is  an effective  subsidy.  It also  assesses the  efficiency  of
"New  View"  of the Property Tax: A Caveat, 30 Nat'l Tax J. 69 (1977);  Mieszkowski
& Zodrow, supra note  9, at 1117-19.  Thus, the old view will not be addressed sepa-
rately here.
15 In  some instances,  tax payments  must  be capitalized.  See  I.R.C. § 263A(a)
(1994).  The focus in the present Article, however, is on whether any sort of deduction
should be permitted rather than on the timing of deductions.
16 See  infra note 44.  Conversely,  if state  and local  taxes were  perfect  benefits
taxes, there would be no redistribution.
1996] 419
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deductibility  with regard  to its  effects  on the size  of state  and
local public sectors and on the pricing of publicly provided goods
and services.
Much of this Article suggests that arguments favoring deduct-
ibility of state  and local taxes  are weaker than most advocates
claim even granting their most commonly offered assumptions.
The simplest argument against deductibility-that state and local
taxes equal benefits received-is stronger in principle than most
arguments favoring deductibility, but the factual predicate of the
usual form of the argument is inaccurate, perhaps to a significant
extent.
Definitive conclusions about the appropriateness of deductibil-
ity prove  difficult  to  reach.  First,  a range  of conflicts  among
different  theories  about tax  and benefit  composition  and inci-
dence  stand  unresolved  by  empirical  evidence.17  Second,  the
efficiency  consequences of deductibility are of uncertain signifi-
cance;  it is not even certain whether they are positive  or nega-
tive.  Finally, whatever is correct in principle, the range of avail-
able alternatives  may be limited by politics.
I.  BENCHMARK  CASES AND ABILITY TO PAY
Sections A and B examine two benchmark cases: taxes equal
to benefits within  the  local jurisdiction  and taxes  unrelated to
benefits.  (For convenience,  "local"  is used as  a  shorthand  for
"state or local"  in much  of the discussion  to follow.)  In each
case, the appropriate federal income tax treatment of state and
local tax payments is determined by the norms used in conven-
tional tax policy analysis.  These two cases are those the litera-
ture most commonly addresses, and they constitute simple, polar
cases that are useful reference  points in the Parts  that follow.
The analysis in Section B also addresses intermediate cases.  (As
long  as  taxes  do  not precisely  equal  benefits,  it  is  commonly
believed that some deduction is appropriate.)
Section  C considers  whether  adjustments  to taxable  income
that reflect differences between taxes paid and benefits received
are indeed justified if taxable income is designed to reflect tax-
17 It is plausible that the truth varies by context: suburbs may be better explained
by one set of theories  and large  cities by another.
420 [Vol. 82:413
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payers'  ability to pay-their economic well-being.  The analysis
suggests  that the argument for adjustments  depends  upon pre-
mises that are often rejected in other contexts.  It is beyond the
scope of the present project to attempt a definitive analysis.
A.  Taxes Equal to Benefits within the Jurisdiction
Local taxes finance local expenditures  on goods and services
for residents.  Thus, residents'  benefits will  have some correla-
tion with their taxes.  Indeed, each resident's taxes and benefits
may be equal in value. 18  After all, taxes and public expenditures
are chosen by residents through the political process.19  In addi-
tion, individuals "vote with their feet."  Individuals whose taxes
exceed benefits  received have an incentive to move to another
jurisdiction, and jurisdictions will attract individuals who would
be permitted to pay less than their share.  If there is sufficient
mobility and a sufficient variety of jurisdictions from which to
choose,  one might  expect  the equilibrium to be one in which
taxes equal benefits.  These arguments are essentially the ones
offered to justify denying  deductibility in Treasury I and Trea-
sury 11,20 the executive branch proposals for tax reform preced-
ing the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
I8 This statement  ignores  consumer  surplus.  More precisely,  benefits  would be
greater than or equal to payments, with equality at the margin.  For private goods, this
result arises from consumer choice in consumption.  For public goods, this result holds
with  efficient provision and Lindahl  pricing: more of a public good  is provided  until
the point at which the marginal cost equals the sum of individuals'  marginal  willing-
ness to pay, and  each individual pays (at the margin) a share equal  to her marginal
willingness to pay.  See, e.g., Harvey S.  Rosen, Public Finance  120-21 (3d ed. 1992);
Paul A. Samuelson, A Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 387
(1954).
19  On  this ground,  Peacock  has  suggested  that (even  at the  national  level)  the
presumption  that the benefits of public goods have  the same  distribution as  taxes  is
"just as plausible a starting-point for discussion of the allocation of indivisible benefits
as one which ignores any reference to the political bargaining process."  Alan Peacock,
The Treatment of Government  Expenditure  in Studies of Income  Redistribution, in
Public Finance and Stabilization Policy 151,164 (Warren L. Smith & John M. Culbert-
son eds., 1974).
20 2 Treasury I, supra note 6, at 63; Treasury II, supra note 6, at 63; see Charles R.
Hulten & Robert M. Schwab, A Haig-Simons-Tiebout  Comprehensive Income  Tax,
44 Nat'l Tax J. 67  (1991).
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If taxes equal benefits, most commentators  would agree that
taxes should not be deductible.  The argument can be expressed
in two ways.  First, purchases  of public goods are analogous  to
purchases  of private goods:  both entail  consumption.  Thus, if
one wishes to tax income-equal to consumption plus accumula-
tion21 -one  must  allow  no  deduction  for  consumption
expenditures  of any kind.  If one permitted  a deduction for ex-
penditures on public but not private goods, economic distortion
would result.  Public goods provision would be excessive because
expenditures to purchase  them would be subsidized.22
Second, it might be said that taxes reduce ability to pay but
benefits from one's  local government are income:  taxes should
be deductible and benefits included as income.  Although in the
abstract it may seem difficult to measure benefits,23  in this  case
the amount  of taxes provides  a precise measure.  Rather than
allowing a deduction and inclusion of equal  amounts, it is sim-
pler just to ignore both benefits and taxes,  thereby denying  a
deduction for state and local taxes.24
Commentators  generally  agree  with this  reasoning.  In the
case  of user charges,  as when a municipality charges  residents
for trash removal, a consensus favors nondeductibility.  Similarly,
most analysts favor the nondeductibility of gasoline taxes, which
approximate  a user  charge  for  roads.25  Many  commentators
differ, however, regarding the assumption that individuals'  pay-
ments  of general  taxes-namely,  property,  sales,  and  income
taxes-equal the value of benefits received.  The implications  of
this disagreement  will now be explored.
21 Henry Simons, Personal  Income Taxation 50  (1938);  see Robert Murray Haig,
The Concept of Income, in The Federal Income Tax 1, 7, 11 (Robert Murray Haig ed.,
1921).
2  See, e.g.,  2 Treasury  I, supra note 6, at 62; Treasury II, supra note  6, at 63-64;
Robert  C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners  Associations, 130  U. Pa. L. Rev.  1519,
1575,  1578-79  (1982).
2 See, e.g., Henry Aaron, Comments, in Comprehensive Income Taxation 30,31-32
(Joseph  A. Pechman ed.,  1977).
24 See, e.g., Billman & Cunningham, supra note 6, at 1111.
2  See, e.g.,  Bradford  & the U.S. Treasury Tax Policy Staff, supra note 1, at 86;
William Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive  Taxation 94 (1947); S.  Rep. No.  1263, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1978).  Deductibility of gasoline taxes was eliminated  by Pub. L.
No. 95-600,  § 111(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2777  (1978).
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B.  Taxes Unrelated to Benefits within the Jurisdiction
1.  Basic Analysis
General state and local taxes are not directly tied to benefits.
Rather, they appear to be largely independent of benefits.  Thus,
a resident  who lives in a mansion  pays much  greater property
taxes than one who lives in a small house, yet they have access
to the same schools,  parks,  and police  department.  Similarly,
rich state residents pay far more than poor residents in sales and
income taxes, yet they have access  to the same roads and state
universities.  Contrary to the taxes-equal-benefits  view, there-
fore, one might hypothesize  that available  benefits are roughly
equal among residents of a given jurisdiction, which implies that
taxes are unrelated to benefits. 2 6
Many argue that if state and local tax payments are unrelated
to  benefits,  those  payments  should  be  deductible. 2 7   In
26 As a practical matter, if benefits are tangibly the same and provide equal utility
to residents, they will have a higher monetary value to those with higher income (who
tend to pay more property, sales, or income taxes)  due to income  effects.  See infra
note 33.
27 See, e.g.,  Musgrave  & Musgrave,  supra note  9, at 345;  George  F. Break, Tax
Principles  in a Federal  System, in The Economics of Taxation  317  (Henry J. Aaron
& Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980); Boris I. Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and
Subsidies for Personal Expenditures, 16 J.L. & Econ.  193, 200-01  (1973).  Billman and
Cunningham argue that:
only two basic  solutions are  available:  (1)  Allow  the deduction for state  and
local taxes,  except  in cases in which  there  is an ascertainable relationship be-
tween the tax payment and the benefit received; or (2)  Disallow the deduction
completely on the assumption  that the predominant portion of state and  local
taxes involves a direct correlation  between benefits and  tax payments.
Billman & Cunningham, supra note 6, at 1113 (footnotes omitted).  They do note the
possibility of intermediate  approaches,  like one described  by John F. Due, Personal
Deductions, in Comprehensive Income Taxation, supra note 23,  at 37, 51-52, wherein
taxpayers would be permitted a deduction above a floor. See Billman & Cunningham,
supra note 6, at 1113  n.23;  see also Bradford  & the U.S. Treasury Tax Policy Staff,
supra  note  1, at 85  (making a  similar suggestion  as  an alternative  to its preferred
proposal).  As suggested in this Subsection, however, none of these approaches consti-
tutes a reasonable first approximation of taxable income  even accepting the premises
these authors  offer.
An intermediate approach closer to that explored here is offered in Zelinsky, supra
note  6.  For example,  he states  that  "[t]here  should  not be  a deduction  for  taxes
financing public services only yielding benefits for the general community when those
benefits  exceed  the socially  accepted minimum  standard  of living, e.g., recreational
services."  Id. at 10-11.  His approach focuses on the character  of the public activities
funded  by state and local taxes, see id. at 10, despite his purported focus  on income
measurement.  See id.  Although Zelinsky sees the approaches as consistent-indeed,
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this case,  tax payments  do not constitute  consumption;  rather,
consumption (the value of local benefits)  is independent  of the
taxes  one  pays.  Those  who  pay  taxes  have  lower  economic
that one is implied by the other-the difference is significant.  For example, Zelinsky
would allow a deduction  for basic educational outlays.  See id. at 10, 40-42.  If basic
outlays were deemed, for example, to be $4,000 per pupil, then taxpayers  in jurisdic-
tions spending $4,000 per pupil receive a deduction  for the full amount whereas those
in jurisdictions spending $3,000 get a lesser deduction (because in no event may there
be a deduction for more than is actually spent).  As a result, a taxpayer in the latter
town  with $1,000  less  income  than one  in the former  town  would  show  the same
taxable income  (gross  income  is  $1,000  less  and deductions  are  $1,000  less),  even
though she  earned less and, accordingly, received  poorer public services  to precisely
this extent.  (His logic applied to private expenditures-a comparison he uses, see id.
at 25-would in principle give a low-income individual a smaller personal  exemption
if she  spent less on food than is assumed to be required for a minimum  standard of
living.)  Zelinsky's argument is applicable to income measurement only when applied
to expenditures  that address  factors reducing the standard of living relative to some
norm.  For example, he suggests that greater expenditures on police services may not
be a sign of enhanced  well-being to the extent they reflect a greater  crime problem
rather than greater public safety compared to jurisdictions with lower expenditures.
See id. at 24.  Thus, one might justify part of the deduction for state and local taxes
as providing a proxy for differences in costs and benefits of living in different jurisdic-
tions.  This subject  is discussed further  in Subsection C.2.  (See particularly note 65.)
Zelinsky  also calls for  deductibility  when taxes finance "public  functions principally
benefiting a discrete segment of the populace rather than the community as a whole,
e.g.,  welfare,  as such redistributive services  do not generate the types  of disparities
with which the tax is concerned."  Id. at 10; see id. at 32-33.  Redistribution  is more
directly relevant to the question of income measurement, although as explained in the
text to follow and in Part IV, it is not obvious that simple deductibility follows in this
case.
McCombs advocates deductibility for the amount of tax payments in excess of that
which funds direct benefits.  See J.B. McCombs, New Federal Tax Treatment of State
and Local Taxes, 19 Pac.  W. 747,755 (1988).  His approach differs from the appropri-
ate treatment described in this Section in two respects: only "direct" benefits (limited
to programs that provide at least proportionate direct benefits to middle class taxpay-
ers, the ones who itemize, see id. at 760) give rise to nondeductibility, and no account
is made of the remainder  (i.e., the deduction given to a taxpayer who pays taxes but
does not receive benefits is not matched by an inclusion for those who receive benefits
in excess of the taxes they pay).  In short, for other than direct benefits, his approach
is one of simple nondeductibility.  The principle reason  given  is one of practicality
with regard to identifying and quantifying indirect benefits.  See id. at 757.  (Indeed,
practical considerations lead  McCombs to propose  deductibility above a $500 floor,
see id. at 761-64, which is virtually equivalent to allowing full  deductibility  and uni-
formly shifting the rate schedule or exemption amounts  for itemizers; differences  in
taxes and benefits across jurisdictions  are ignored entirely.)  This common feasibility
objection implicitly assumes that the best approximation of a local resident's benefits
is zero rather than the taxes they pay or some simple adjustment of the sort described
in this Subsection.  See infra note 30.
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well-being  to the  extent  of their payments,  so  a  deduction  is
necessary if ability to pay is to be measured properly.
The foregoing  analysis, however,  is incomplete.  Although  it
may justify the deductibility  of taxes,  the argument  would not
warrant  excluding  benefits  from income.  Because  everyone's
benefits are, by assumption,  the same, it may seem immaterial
whether there is  such an inclusion.  (An adjustment in the rate
schedule  applicable to everyone could take this into  account.28)
But this response is correct only if there is a single local jurisdic-
tion,  in  which  case  problems  of  federalism  would  be  trivial.
Otherwise,  a taxpayer who  lives  in a wealthy jurisdiction  will
benefit from schools, parks, and police protection that are better
than those available to one who lives in a poorer jurisdiction and
pays the same amount  of tax.  Allowing deductibility  while ig-
noring benefits would fail to capture this difference.
Even when  each  resident's  taxes  are unrelated  to benefits,
residents' taxes are on average equal to residents' benefits within
a given jurisdiction.29  As  a result, if some residents'  ability to
pay is lower  on account  of their payment of taxes in excess  of
benefits,  other residents'  ability  to pay must be higher  on  ac-
count of their receipt of benefits in excess  of taxes.  If the for-
mer are entitled to a deduction for the difference between taxes
and benefits, the latter should be required to include the differ-
ence in income.30
28  For example, if $1,000 of benefits is omitted for everyone, $1,000 could be sub-
tracted from the starting point of each bracket.  If the benefits were per capita rather
than per tax unit, one could subtract $1,000  from each personal exemption.
29 See the qualification concerning consumer surplus in note 18 and that concerning
public expenditures that offset lower amenities in note 27 (discussing one of Zelinsky's
arguments).  In addition, jurisdictions may vary in the value of benefits produced  on
account of differences  in scale economies or production costs; in these instances, the
analysis in Section I.C, particularly the comparison to cost-of-living differences, would
be relevant.  One could also argue that government is inefficient, and thus benefits are
less  than average  taxes.  If such  a view were  accepted,  then a  figure  less  than T,
reflecting the extent of waste in the relevant jurisdiction, would be subtracted in the
formulation offered below.  No matter  how inefficient  local government is believed
to be, however, it is implausible that most resources are wasted  and that individuals
in wealthier jurisdictions  receive no more than those paying taxes  at the same rates
in poorer jurisdictions.
30 Implicit  in some arguments  for deductibility is the view that when error is un-
avoidable, it is best to err in favor of the taxpayer.  What is overlooked is that, given
a target level of revenue (to spend on public goods or redistribution), reductions  in
one taxpayer's burden must be made up by increases in others' burdens.  The problem
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To implement this  approach, one could allow each taxpayer
a deduction of Ti - T, where Ti is the tax paid by the individual
to the locality, and T is the  average  level  of taxes paid by  all
individuals  in  the  locality31-which  is  assumed  here  to  equal
benefits received.  Those who pay relatively high taxes will have
a Ti that exceeds T, so they will receive a deduction to that ex-
tent.  For those who pay relatively low taxes, Ti -T will be nega-
tive, indicating an inclusion.
To illustrate  this scheme, suppose that towns A and B each
have  only two residents.  In A,  Resident  1 pays  $4,000 in tax,
and Resident  2 pays  $2,000.  T  is  $3,000;  Resident  1  takes  a
$1,000 deduction, and Resident 2 has  a $1,000  inclusion.  In B,
Resident  1 and Resident  2 each pay $5,000.  In this  case, T is
$5,000, and neither resident has a deduction  or inclusion.  Ob-
serve that some individuals  (here, Resident 1 in A) may have a
higher deduction than others who  pay more taxes  (those in B).
The reason  is that  deductions  are  adjusted for benefits.  This
approach,  therefore, avoids  the objection that deductibility  fa-
vors those  who live in high-benefit jurisdictions. 32
2.  Intermediate Cases
Suppose that, within jurisdictions, individuals  who pay more
tax receive more benefits, but the benefits  do not fully reflect
of defining income in designing a tax base is not one that involves a trade-off between
generosity  to taxpayers and to the government.  Rather, the problem is  how to allo-
cate burdens among taxpayers. Thus, taking revenue requirements into account, it will
always be true (as  a matter of definition) that measurement errors are minimized by
the best approximation, rather than by providing treatment at an extreme (even if the
chosen extreme is less erroneous on average than the opposite extreme).  See gener-
ally Kaplow,  supra  note 4  (income  measurement,  not revenue,  relevant  in setting
standard  deduction);  Louis  Kaplow,  Accuracy,  Complexity,  and  the  Income  Tax,
Harvard  Law  School  Program  in  Law  and Economics  Discussion  Paper  No.  139
(1994).  (A more complete  analysis  would  account for the fact  that when  there  is
uncertainty, distributive  objectives may not be achieved optimally by using the mean
estimate;  when  the variance is greater  or when  the individual's  income  is  lower, a
figure below the mean will tend to be more  appropriate.)
31 When the composition of taxable  units differs (for example, single individuals
versus married couples), it would be necessary to estimate how benefits varied among
such units to allocate this tax-based  estimate of total benefits.  See also infra Subsec-
tion 4 (demographic redistribution).
32 See infra Section VI.A.  There still will be differences under an income tax with
graduated rates and itemization: large deductions, received by high-income taxpayers,
will  be worth more than the cost of large inclusions  to low-income taxpayers.
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the difference  in taxes they pay.  For example, those who have
more luxurious houses may benefit more from police protection
and road quality.33  As  a result, the Ti - T deduction would be
too large  (as would the corresponding  inclusion for those who
pay low taxes).  One might instead  allow a deduction of a(Ti -
T), where  a is  less than one.34
Suppose  instead  that  lower-income  residents'  benefits  are
higher  than  average.  This  would  be true  when tax  revenues
fund welfare programs.  Also, public schools might be used by
the poor and middle class, whereas the rich might opt for private
schools.  In this case,  a could be set to exceed one.35  Then the
rich would  get  a deduction  exceeding  the  difference  between
their tax payment and the jurisdictional  average, and the inclu-
sion for lower-income individuals would be greater.
At this point, the existence  and magnitude  of any deduction
or  inclusion  on  account  of state  and local  taxes  and  benefits
appears to depend on the empirical question of the incidence of
benefits relative to taxes.  Reliable empirical evidence is difficult
to obtain, so the question of incidence is addressed in large part
by theory.  This topic is considered  in Parts II and III.
3 Also, due to income  effects, the rich place a higher monetary  value on a given
level of public  services.  It is  familiar that for most goods  and services,  individuals
demand a greater quantity  at a given price the higher  is their income.  This  implies
that the marginal valuation (measured in dollars) for each unit is higher, even though
the utility it generates is  the same.  This property  is related to the diminishing  mar-
ginal utility of income, which implies that one is willing to pay more for a given good
or service generating a given  amount of utility the higher is one's  income, because
when  income is higher the forgone  utility from alternative  expenditures is lower.
34  This  adjustment  assumes  that the  relationship  between  benefits  and  taxes  is
linear; if it is not, more complex adjustments could  be employed.
35 The second benchmark, of taxes unrelated to benefits, is thus not really a polar
case.  That  of taxes negatively correlated  to benefits,  considered  here,  is more  ex-
treme.
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3.  Fiscal  Equalization 36
The treatment of taxes under the second benchmark that has
just been  described in the preceding  Subsections  assumes that
average taxes paid in the jurisdiction provide a measure of bene-
fits in the jurisdiction.  But this is typically inaccurate, especially
for localities, because average local tax payments do not include
benefits  conferred  by  grants  and  other support  received  from
higher levels of government.37
To illustrate how such grants can be accounted for under the
second benchmark, consider the case of state aid to local govern-
ment.  (A more complete account requires consideration  of fed-
eral aid38 and whether higher levels of government exercise influ-
ence on spending  at lower levels  through matching  grants  and
mandates.39)  In applying the second benchmark to state taxes,
benefits will  not be uniform if aid to localities  is not uniform;
residents  of localities that receive  more state aid  receive more
benefits.  To account for this, one  can combine  state and local
taxes paid in determining Ti for each taxpayer and also take into
account state aid in determining T for each locality.  To take an
extreme case, suppose that state aid was fully equalizing, so that
benefits  per capita were the  same in each  locality.  Then, the
relevant  T in each locality would be the  same:  the  average  of
state  and local  taxes  combined.  Individuals  paying  combined
state and local taxes above the average for the state would re-
36 For a theoretical  analysis, see Robin Boadway & Frank Flatters, Efficiency and
Equalization Payments in a Federal  System of Government:  A Synthesis  and Exten-
sion of Recent Results,  15 Can. J. Econ. 613 (1982).  For information on the increase
in fiscal equalization in recent decades, see Andrew Reschovsky, Fiscal  Equalization
and School Finance, 47 Nat'l Tax J. 185, 190 (1994).  For discussion of how capitaliza-
tion may offset some effects of equalization, see Helen F. Ladd  & John Yinger, The
Case for Equalizing Aid, 47 Nat'l Tax J. 211, 218-20 (1994).  For criticism of many of
the reasons given for fiscal equalization, see William H. Oakland, Fiscal Equalization:
An Empty Box, 47 Nat'l Tax J. 199 (1994).
37  See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 43 & n.91; infra Sections  IV.A and V.A.
38  As  discussed in note 44, if ability to pay is measured  for distributive purposes,
it is appropriate to treat the portion  of federal taxes funding benefits received from
the federal  government separately.  To accomplish this, one must allocate benefits to
recipients in order to determine what portion of recipients'  taxes should be associated
with financing benefits.
39 For a discussion of how matching grants and mandates  may affect the relation-
ship between expenditures  made and the value of benefits produced, see note 187.
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ceive deductions  to that extent, and those paying less  than the
average would include the difference in their taxable income.
4.  Demographic Redistribution
This Section, as well as the rest of the Article, generally  dis-
cusses  redistribution  as though  it involves  transfers  across  in-
come levels, particularly from the rich to the poor.  But the logic
of the analysis does not depend on this, and a significant portion
of state and local spending may involve  a sort of demographic
redistribution.  The most important instance is public education,
which favors families with children (and larger numbers of chil-
dren) over taxpaying units that do not have children.40
The main effect on the seconctbenchmark  would be that the
use of T, the average level of taxes, as a proxy for a typical tax-
paying unit's benefits  may be highly inaccurate.41  One  could
imagine a simple adjustment; for example, the portion of T spent
on elementary schools might be allocated among taxpaying units
based upon the number of school-age children (so none  of that
portion  would be allocated  to  childless  taxpaying  units  and  a
greater  amount would be allocated to families with many  chil-
dren).42  This  reinterpretation  of T would make  applicable the
analysis of the second benchmark that appears in the rest of the
Article.
40  Among families with children, public education disfavors those who do not use
public  schools.  There are other forms of demographic  redistribution, such as other
spending that  targets children  (playgrounds)  or  spending on  the  elderly.  See also
supra  note 31  (describing  problem  of allocating  benefits  among  different  types  of
taxable units).
41  On a lifetime basis, the approximation may not be as inaccurate, particularly for
individuals  who live  much  of their  lives  in jurisdictions  providing  a similar mix  of
services.
42 See Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 41.  One might object to this approach because the
current  income tax  makes  little  allowance  for children  (except  in the  separate  tax
schedule for heads of households, see I.R.C. § 1(b) (1994)).  Such a proposal, however,
might be accompanied by  an increase in the value  of exemptions for children.  (In-
deed, one might justify the current low exemptions by the fact that a significant por-
tion of the expenses of raising children are publicly borne, with the benefits excluded
from the tax system.)
1996] 429
HeinOnline -- 82 Va. L. Rev.  429 1996Virginia Law Review
5.  Summary
The preceding Subsections have suggested numerous qualifica-
tions and complications concerning the second benchmark, which
calls for a deduction of T  - T rather than a simple deduction of
Ti. Others will be raised elsewhere  in the Article.  Obviously,
many administrative  questions  would have to be resolved if the
second benchmark were actually to be implemented.  Such ques-
tions will not be examined here.  The present investigation does
not advocate  adoption of the second  benchmark  or  any other
particular regime.  Rather, it seeks to illuminate the implications
of a range  of arguments  concerning  deductibility,  taking  into
account the actual incidence of taxes and benefits  and the crite-
ria that are appropriate in evaluating income tax provisions.  For
this purpose, it will be useful to continue to refer to the second
benchmark simply as entailing a deduction of T  - T, keeping in
mind  that T  is  a  stand-in  for the  best  feasible  proxy  of each
individual's actual benefits  (which might have been denoted Bi)
and that other issues concerning the benchmark are being put to
the side.
C. Ability to Pay and Economic Well-Being
The  discussion in Sections A and B suggests what treatment
of state and local taxes under the federal income tax is "appro-
priate"  in light  of various  assumptions  about  the relationship
between taxes  paid  and  benefits  received.  But no  evaluative
norm was elaborated.  The criterion implicitly being invoked is
a familiar notion of ability to pay, which is understood to refer
to taxpayers'  economic well-being.43  The motivation for using
such  a criterion  arises  from the  redistributive  function  of the
income  tax:  a measure  of well-being  is required  to determine
who  should pay  how much  to  whom.44  For  this  purpose, all
43 For  an  illustrative  discussion  and  references  to  the  familiar  statements,  see
Zelinsky, supra note 6, at 18-21.
44 Financing public goods and services (other than redistribution itself) is implicitly
assumed to be accomplished  by benefits taxation.  The distinction between financing
benefits and redistribution  is conceptually useful but is not a practical  restriction.  As
will  be discussed,  see infra  text  accompanying  note  153,  one  can  describe  any  tax
scheme in a way that separates the benefit-financing and redistributive functions.  See
Louis Kaplow, Should the Government's Allocation Branch Be Concerned About the
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would  agree  that  a  taxpayer  who  receives  wage  income  of
$30,000 is similarly situated to one who is self-employed, grosses
$50,000,  and incurs  $20,000 of business  expenses.  Measures  of
well-being are, however, notoriously ambiguous in other settings.
When one assesses an issue as complex and controversial  as the
deductibility of state and local taxes, therefore, it is important to
specify and defend one's criterion carefully.4 5  Subtle differences
that are irrelevant in some contexts may be important here.46
1.  Competing Bases for Valuation
The principal problem  concerns whether one should impute
values based on payments or infer values from actions.  To put
it more  concretely,  consider  an  individual  who  moves  into  a
jurisdiction  in  which  she  must pay  $4,000  in  taxes  to  finance
benefits that cost $3,000 per capita and are equally available  to
Distortionary Cost of Taxation and Distributive Effects, Harvard Law School Program
in Law and Economics Discussion Paper  No. 137 (1993).
This  perspective differs from a more common one in which  ability to pay is said
to be relevant to determine citizens' appropriate contributions  to finance government
activity.  It is not clear, however, why citizens should, for example, pay a percentage
of their income for goods that happen as a matter of existing technology to be "pub-
lic"-say, roads-but pay the same absolute amount as everyone else for technologi-
cally "private" goods-such as cars (if they buy the same quality of car).  Suppose that
tolls measuring  congestion and road wear could costlessly be charged, with resulting
efficiency gains from more efficient allocation of road usage, and that the revenue was
sufficient to finance the roads.  Is the availability of such pricing technology a good
normative reason for changing the income  distribution?  (Individuals  with differing
incomes  making  equal  use  of roads  would  pay  the  same  amount  rather  than  an
amount in proportion to their income.)
In principle, the measure of well-being should be derived from the norms of dis-
tributive justice  that motivate  the redistributive  function  of the income  tax.  If  a
welfarist  approach  is adopted-e.g., a utilitarian  or Rawlsian  approach,  see Joseph
Bankman and Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure:  A New Look
at  Progressive  Taxation,  75  Cal.  L.  Rev.  1905  (1987)-the  perspective  separating
benefits  financing and redistribution suggested here would follow.  In the discussion
below, however,  it will  be seen that not all distributive theories  imply the same ap-
proach  to the measurement of well-being.
45 See sources cited supra note 11 (concerning the need to be explicit in specifying
tax objectives) and infra note 61  (on different distributive criteria).
46 The analysis to follow pursues only the question whether some sort of deduction
system, particularly that of the second benchmark, best measures economic well-being.
There  is the further question  of whether, taking into account the adverse incentive
effects of redistributive taxation, such an adjustment is best.  (This issue is not already
captured implicitly in setting tax rates because it need not be true that all adjustments
designed to better measure well-being would  affect incentives  to the same extent.)
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and used by all residents.47  The analysis  of the second bench-
mark  stipulated that a  $1,000  deduction  is  appropriate  in this
case.  (Ti  is  $4,000  and T is  $3,000,  so Ti  - T is  $1,000.)  The
reason  is  that  this  individual's  economic  well-being  is  $1,000
lower on account of taxes and public services.  Two comparisons
support this claim.  First, the taxpayer might be seen as $1,000
worse off than one who did not live in the jurisdiction and thus
did not pay $4,000 in taxes and receive $3,000 in public benefits.
Second, the taxpayer might be compared to the average taxpayer
in the jurisdiction,  who pays  only  $3,000  to receive  the  same
benefits.
An alternative  argument, however, suggests that such differ-
ences in taxes and benefits be ignored, resulting in no deduction
or inclusion for any taxpayer.  The point is that we should not
impute a value of $3,000 for the services this individual receives.
Rather, we should infer the value  from what she actually pays,
which  is  $4,000.  Such  a process  of inference  guarantees  that
taxes  will  equal benefits  for  all individuals,  so no  adjustment
would ever be required.
This  approach  is  supported  by  analogy to  the purchase  of
private goods.  Individuals who buy goods on sale do not have
their savings imputed as income.  The reason in principle is that
there  is no  reason  to presume  that  the  goods  are  worth  any
more than what is actually paid.  Similarly, individuals who pay
more  for goods  are  not permitted  a  deduction  for the  excess
they paid.  The implicit presumption is that, typically, individuals
who pay more get more.  For example, the higher  price  may
reflect shopping at a convenience store, so that there is a benefit
from saving time.
The presumptions regarding consumers' purchasing decisions
are justified by simple  demand analysis.  Individuals  purchase
additional  quantities  of  goods  and  services  until the  point  at
which their marginal cost-the price-just equals their marginal
benefit.  Thus, whatever price individuals are charged, their mar-
ginal purchases will produce  benefits that yield no surplus (and
involve  no  loss).  Their  inframarginal  purchases-the  initial
quantities  they  purchase  before  reaching  the  stopping
47 To simplify, income  effects, see supra note 33, are ignored here as in the discus-
sion of the benchmark  case.
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point-generally yield positive net benefits, referred to  as con-
sumer surplus.  Because consumer surplus cannot be observed,
however, the tax system cannot take it into account.  Moreover,
one suspects that individuals with equal income probably benefit
to a similar extent from consumer surplus, so no obvious ineq-
uity results.  And, if there is inequity among equal-income indi-
viduals, there usually would be no way to correct it.48
This approach has substantial force with respect to local taxes
and public services, although there often are differences between
the contexts  of selecting jurisdictions and choosing among ordi-
nary consumer goods.  Most notably, one usually cannot choose
the precise  amount and composition of public services.  This is
because jurisdictional choices are absolutely limited and further
constrained  by factors  such  as information, job  skills,  and  the
location  of family and friends.  Sometimes, however, the same
problem arises with private goods.49  Individuals choose among
the available  options.  If some individuals  seem to spend more
on food or automobiles, we are inclined to infer that the aggre-
gate mix of what they buy, in light of their preferences, provides
the best value for their money and a value at least equal to what
they pay.  Similar  reasoning seems  applicable  to the choice  of
local jurisdictions.
Another possibly important distinction between the contexts
is that where  one  lives  is related  to work;  as  with  commuting
expenses, there is some mix of business and personal dimensions.
To illustrate, suppose that one is indifferent between the public
services provided by two towns.  The taxes in A are $3,000 and
in B are $4,000, but jobs in one's line of work that are accessible
from  B  pay  $1,500  more  than jobs  accessible  from  A.  The
choice to live in B is made because  one earns $1,500 more at a
4 Absent information about who receives more than average surplus, "correction"
is as likely to increase error as to correct it.  Moreover, because the marginal  equity
cost of errors generally increases with their magnitude (this is certainly plausible under
most  welfarist perspectives,  see  Kaplow,  supra note  30),  welfare  is  maximized  by
making no  adjustment rather than by random adjustment.
If individuals at different income  levels receive systematically  different levels  of
consumer surplus and such differences  are believed relevant, the appropriate adjust-
ment would be to vary tax rates directly.
49  No health club has just the right mix of facilities,  ambience, and location.  No
car has just the right size, options, and color.  The restaurant with the best food  is in
the wrong location;  the one with the best atmosphere has lousy desserts.
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cost of $1,000  in taxes.  In this situation,  one could argue that
the additional $1,000 in taxes are a cost of earning income  and
therefore  should be deductible.50
Presumably, this sort of argument is usually rejected because
it is difficult to determine when the facts are as stated.  For ex-
ample, an individual who would earn less in B would still choose
to live  there  if she  valued  the benefits  in  B  sufficiently  more
than those in A.51  The implicit claim supporting a view that no
adjustment  should  be  made  is  that,  when  individuals  are
observed to pay more  in taxes for public services,  they are on
average receiving more consumption in return, just as individuals
who pay more in rent or at restaurants are presumed on average
to benefit more.  This claim is not, of course,  completely accu-
rate  for any particular  individual;  rather, the argument  is that
this presumption is the most accurate among feasible character-
izations, given the available information.
As  is  well  known,  the  issues  under  discussion  are  hardly
unique to the problem of state and local taxes.  The problems
concerning consumer surplus, imputed income, and unobservable
nonpecuniary  differences in jobs arise in connection with many
aspects of income taxation.  An appropriate resolution is beyond
the scope of this narrower inquiry.  It should be apparent, how-
ever, that even the more  limited argument for  deductions  and
inclusions  presented  in  the context  of the  second  benchmark
depends  on how these  issues  are resolved.  Further consider-
ations  bearing  on  this  issue in  the context  of state  and  local
taxes are offered in the following Subsection and in the analysis
in Parts IV and V concerning the use of state and local taxes to
50  Analogously, suppose  that commuting expenses rather than taxes  were $1,000
higher in B.  (That is, the low-paying job  is closer to A, and  the high-paying job is
closer to B but not as close to B  as the low-paying job is to A: commuting  expenses
are $1,000 higher for the good job near B.)  Again, town B is preferable because one
nets $500 more, and the argument would require that commuting expenses be deduct-
ible.  See William A. Klein, Income Taxation  and Commuting Expenses: Tax Policy
and the Need  for Nonsimplistic  Analysis  of "Simple"  Problems, 54 Cornell  L. Rev.
871,  884-85. (1969).  But see infra note 51.
51  Similarly, one can revisit the argument developed supra note 50, which suggests
that commuting expenses should be deductible  on the ground that higher commuting
expenses may be incurred to earn higher wages.  The probleni  is that higher commut-
ing expenses may be incurred to save time instead (by using a more expensive means
of transport to arrive sooner) or they may be incurred to reside in an area with better
amenities.
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finance redistribution and other activities that may involve inter-
jurisdictional spillovers.
2.  Comparison to Cost-of-Living Adjustments
Interjurisdictional  differences  in  state  and  local  taxes  and
benefits can be seen as an instance of the more general problem
of regional cost-of-living differences.  Suppose, for example, that
the only difference between living in region A rather than region
B  is that  all goods  and services  are 5%  more expensive  in A.
The cost residents bear is the same as it would be were there no
real cost-of-living difference but instead all purchases in A were
subject to a 5%  sales tax.  The major difference is that the sales
tax revenue presumably  funds benefits in A.  To the extent  of
any difference  between  taxes paid  and benefits  received,  how-
ever, the cost-of-living analogy holds.  Indeed, taxes are but one
of many  costs  that differ  among  regions.  Some  literature  on
cost-of-living  measurement  has  recognized  this  connection  in
addressing the need to take taxes and government benefits into
account.5 2  The  following  discussion  offers  a brief  analysis  of
pure cost-of-living differences to see what insight may be offered
concerning  whether the deductibility of state and local taxes is
appropriate.
a.  Simple Cost-of-Living Adjustments3
When costs are uniformly 5%  higher in A than in B, should
residents in A be allowed  a deduction equal to 5%  of income?
To be more concrete, compare a worker in A who earns $21,000
with one in B who earns $20,000.  In the absence of taxes, they
have the  same economic  well-being  (because  $21,000 in A has
the same buying power as $20,000 in B).  Does it follow that the
52 See, e.g., Martin David, Measurement of the Cost of Living Including the Public
Sector, 4 Annals Econ. & Soc. Meas. 133-52 (1975); Joseph Gyourko & Joseph Tracy,
The Importance of Local Fiscal Conditions in Analyzing Local Labor Markets,  97 J.
Pol.  Econ.  1208  (1989);  Joseph  Gyourko  & Joseph  Tracy,  The  Structure  of Local
Public Finance and the Quality of Life, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 774 (1991).
5 The analysis  in this Subsection is developed at greater length in Louis  Kaplow,
Regional  Cost-of-Living Adjustments in Tax-Transfer Schemes, Harvard Program in
Law and Economics Working Paper No.  150  (1995)  (forthcoming  in 50 Tax L. Rev.
1 (1995).
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worker in A  should be permitted  an income  tax deduction  of
$1,000,  reducing  her  $21,000  of income  to  taxable  income  of
$20,000,  indicating  the same  ability to pay as the worker in B
who earns $20,000?
Such treatment  would  be too  generous, in  the sense  that it
would result in the worker in A having a higher after-tax level
of well-being  than the worker in B.  To see  this, suppose  that
the income  tax is  a flat  10%,  so  that  $2,000  is  owed  by both
taxpayers given the posited adjustment.  Observe that this equal
nominal tax payment imposes a lower real burden on the worker
in A, because $2,000 given up to the government would not have
bought as much  (in real terms) in A as in B.  To put this  an-
other  way,  note  that  the  ratio  of  their  before-tax  incomes,
$21,000/$20,000, is 1.05,  but their ratio of after-tax incomes if a
deduction  is allowed, $19,000/$18,000,  is  1.0556.
Suppose  instead that no deduction were  allowed.  Then the
worker in A would pay $2,100 in tax, for an after-tax income  of
$18,900.  Now,  the  ratio  of  their  after-tax  incomes  is
$18,900/$18,000,  or  1.05.  Thus, despite  the  real  cost-of-living
difference,  providing no deduction  yields a result under which
relative well-being is unaffected by the income tax.54
If one modified the example to allow for progressive marginal
rates or welfare payments  to the poor, it can be demonstrated
that  the  adjustment  which  preserves  relative  well-being  after
payment of taxes is not a deduction but instead involves changes
that  are  equivalent  to  conventional  indexing  for  inflation:55
brackets and exemptions would be adjusted by the cost-of-living
difference,  as would welfare entitlements.
b.  Application to State and Local Taxes
The analysis in the preceding Subsection indicates that bench-
mark treatment,  which  provides  a deduction  of Ti - T for  the
case in which all residents receive equal benefits, is incorrect on
54  Another way to see why this result is correct is to note that the buying power
of the $2,100 paid in tax by the worker in A is the same as that of the $2,000 paid in
tax by the worker in B.  Each worker, therefore, has  the same buying power before
tax and gives up the same buying power in making tax payments, so it must be that
their buying power is the same  after tax.
55  See, e.g., Inflation and the Income Tax (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1976).
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its own terms for taxes on consumption,  including the sales tax
and arguably the property tax.  If benefits are uniform and equal
to T, they could be added to income, but the appropriate treat-
ment of Ti would  be similar to that just described  if the  state
and local taxes were proportional to income. 5 6  (This is approxi-
mately true for sales taxes and is closer to the truth for property
taxes than the opposite assumption that taxes are independent
of income.57)  It follows  from  the illustration in the preceding
Subsection that a deduction of Ti - T would be too large by this
standard.
58
By contrast, with a typical state income tax, the analysis of the
second benchmark would remain  applicable.  In brief, the dis-
tinction  between  the  two  types  of  taxes  is  that  taxes  on
consumption, like the sales tax, already entail an implicit deduc-
56  To put this another way, assume that  there is  no federal  income  tax and an
individual  in jurisdiction A pays a state sales tax at rate t which  funds a benefit of
value T.  An individual in jurisdiction  B, which has no state tax and no state-funded
benefit, would  have the same  level of well-being if he had income  1-t as  high,  aug-
mented  by the value of the benefit.  If one applied the federal  tax regime described
in the text-including  the benefit in taxable income, allowing  no deduction  for the
state tax, and making inflation-indexing-type  adjustments to the tax schedule  (there
would  be  none  if it were  a  flat-rate federal  income  tax  with  no  exemption)-the
after-tax effective consumption  (actual  consumption  of private goods plus the value
of any public benefit) would continue to be the same for both individuals.  (There is
a slight detail omitted: because the public benefit is not itself subject to the state tax,
it would have to be multiplied by 1/(l-t) to convert it into dollars equivalent in terms
of buying power to the rest of the taxpayer's income, which is subject to the state tax.
Also, one must account for the fact that revenue and thus public benefits will be lower
with a federal  income tax in place.)
57  Indeed,  if taxes  are independent of income, the treatment  that would result in
taxes not affecting relative well-being  among regions  entails permitting a deduction.
See Kaplow, supra note 53,  at 29-31.  This result follows from the same logic indicat-
ing that an inclusion  of T is appropriate if benefits are the same for all levels  of in-
come.  Of course, allowing all a deduction of T and requiring all to include T would
be equivalent to simply disallowing the deduction.
5s The previous illustration showed that allowing a deduction for the cost-of-living
difference, which here is T, would be too large.  If one subtracts T from this deduc-
tion (Ti - T), it follows that the resulting deduction would be too large compared to
the combined  effect  of a cost-of-living adjustment  and inclusion  of the benefit T in
income (because, after all, including T is equivalent to subtracting T from any deduc-
tions that are taken).
It  can be  shown that  if benefits or taxes  vary with  income but not in a strictly
proportional manner, the adjustments that preserve relative well-being would be more
complicated, but it still would generally be true that the benchmark  deduction would
be too large according to this approach.  See Kaplow, supra note 53, at 31-32.
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tion for the federal  income tax because  consumption (the base
of the tax) is financed with after-federal-income-tax  dollars.59
It is worth noting that all of this discussion is premised on an
assumption  implicit  in  conventional  ability-to-pay  analysis  of
deductibility: the state and local tax regime is taken as given.  If,
instead, state and local taxes will be adjusted in light of federal
taxes-including  the rules  regarding  deductibility-the  proper
analysis  would  differ.  For example, if state  and local  govern-
ments were to adjust taxes in response to federal rule changes
in a manner that preserved the after-tax distribution of income,
ability-to-pay  questions  would  become  moot,  and  the  matter
would concern the appropriateness  of the resulting distribution
of revenue available to state and local governments.60
Much  of the  analysis  in  this  Article,  including  the  present
discussion  of cost-of-living  differences,  takes  for  granted  that
adjustments that preserve relative well-being across jurisdictions
are desirable.  Although such equitable treatment  often may be
appropriate,61 it need  not be  in the  present  context.  From  a
19 That is, the typical state income tax applies to before-federal-income-tax dollars,
assuming that the state tax does not allow a deduction for the federal tax.  (For those
state income taxes that do allow a deduction-thereby automatically  changing when
the federal income  tax changes-the  previous  discussion  of the sales  tax would  be
applicable.)  Observe that in the simple case of a proportional state income tax at rate
t. and a federal income  tax at rate t, deductibility of the federal tax-in the amount
tfY, where Y is income-on the state tax is worth tStfY, which  is exactly  what deduc-
tion of state income tax-in the amount of tY-on the federal  tax at rate tf is worth.
60  See infra note 62  and Parts  IV-VI.  For the purposes  of examining  this  issue
concerning available state and local revenue, one might wish to take as a benchmark
the distribution that would exist in the absence of the federal income tax. The preced-
ing analysis in the text would then be alplicable (for then the assumption of ignoring
reactions to changes in the federal income tax would be an appropriate  one), as well
as  the discussion to  follow concerning the  possibility that tax  differences  might be
offset by amenity differences.
61 The criterion involves comparing  welfare levels among individuals,  which may
be appropriate  if the applicable  redistributive  norm  were  based  on  the egalitarian
approach associated with John  Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).  For a social choice
theory  literature  survey  that compares  distributive  theories,  see Amartya  Sen,  On
Weights  and  Measures:  Informational  Constraints  in  Social  Welfare  Analysis,  45
Econometrica 1539 (1977).  The utilitarian approach  is developed and  defended for-
mally in John C. Harsanyi, Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium  in Games
and Social Situations ch. 4 (1977); see also  Louis Kaplow, A Fundamental  Objection
to Tax Equity Norms: A Call for Utilitarianism, 48 Nat'l Tax J. 497 (1995)  (defending
a utilitarian approach to tax policy).  A major difference  between the utilitarian  ap-
proach  and the  Rawlsian approach  is that the utilitarian  approach is concerned with
equating individuals' marginal utilities rather than total utilities.  See generally Dennis
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national perspective, different tax burdens may result in a more
favorable distribution or might allow the federal government to
conserve revenue; pursuing such subtleties is beyond the scope
of the present investigation.6 2
Another  problem with  any sort of cost-of-living  adjustment
involves interregional  differences in amenities.  For example, if
A is a particularly  desirable place to live  (low crime,  good cli-
mate, recreational facilities), it will attract residents, which will
bid up land rents and contribute to a higher cost of living.  Cost-
of-living adjustments might then lead to a less reliable indication
of relative well-being.63  Similarly, it may be that some jurisdic-
tions can impose higher taxes on wealthy residents without pro-
viding public services  to them and nonetheless  avoid excessive
out-migration precisely because the jurisdiction has amenities  of
the sort preferred by high-income residents.  In that case, failing
to allow a deduction for their higher taxes would offset the fail-
ure to tax the benefits  they receive from the better amenities. 64
This qualification to any argument for adjustments is related
to the view noted in Subsection 1 that one should not impute the
value of costs and benefits but rather infer value from individu-
als'  actual  decisions.  If high-wage  workers  stay in New York
C. Mueller, Public Choice II chs. 21,22 (1989)  (introducing and summarizing critiques
of both formulations);  Bankman  & Griffith, supra  note 44  (applying  Rawlsian  and
utilitarian formulations of distributive justice to the income tax).
Designing a tax to preserve relative welfare levels across regions also has efficiency
implications  with regard  to the interregional allocation  of production.  See Kaplow,
supra note 53, at 10-11.  Compare Oakland's discussion of why fiscal equalization may
be inefficient because, by compensating for real cost differences  among localities, lo-
cational  incentives  will be distorted.  Oakland, supra note 36, at 203-04.
62 These ideas are explored in Kaplow, supra note 53, at 12-17, in the context of
real cost-of-living differences.  A contrast with the present context is that here, savings
might arise not from economizing  on real resources  but from reducing revenues  of
some state and local governments.  Assessing such effects would depend in part on the
desirability of these governments pursuing policies  that provide benefits to their resi-
dents that differ from the taxes they pay and on whether jurisdictions that are able to
impose additional  taxes on wealthy  inhabitants are entitled  to that revenue for local
use rather than having the revenue taxed and distributed by the federal government.
See infra Parts IV-VI.
63See Jennifer Roback, Wages, Rents, and Amenities: Differences Among Workers
and Regions, 26 Econ. Inquiry 23  (1988).
6 In the absence of higher taxes, one might expect the value of the amenities to
lead to higher land prices; paying more rent would be viewed as nondeductible con-
sumption (although homeowners' consumption  would implicitly be deductible because
imputed rental income  is untaxed).  See also infra note 65.
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City despite its high tax rates, it must be that there are sufficient
offsetting attractions to keep them there, so one should not pre-
sume that their well-being is lower than that of individuals who
earn the  same  wage  elsewhere  and pay lower state  and local
taxes.
65
In principle, it may be possible to determine real cost-of-living
differences  (including the  effects  of  state  and  local  taxes)  by
comparing  wages  paid  in  different  jurisdictions  for the  same
occupation.  If wages are higher in A than in B, this would tend
to reflect differences in living costs net of amenity differences.66
Such information would permit cost-of-living adjustments with-
out  separately  identifying  the component  that was  due to tax
6  Similar reasoning is applicable to Zelinsky's argument, discussed supra note 27,
that some deductibility may be justified because the tax revenue should be seen not
as funding benefits but as restoring a deficit, as when more funds are spent on police
because crime is unusually high.  Individuals will choose to live in a high-crime (or an
average-crime  but high-tax)  area only if there  are offsetting benefits, such as other,
positive amenities,  lower rents, and so on;  that is, the overall package  must be suffi-
ciently attractive.  From this reference point, spending more to improve one compo-
nent, even if that component is initially below  average, should be seen as producing
a benefit.
One complication  is untaxed imputed income.  If one amenity offsets a deficit in
another, or if low rent offsets a disamenity, there is symmetry with respect to the tax
system.  If, instead, higher wages offset disamenities, the result is different because the
lower amenity reduces untaxed imputed  income whereas the higher wage raises tax-
able income.  (This problem is no different than that which arises without regard to
the problem of state and local taxes: when coal miners are paid more than clerks who
work in pleasant surroundings, the compensating wage differential paid to the former
is  taxed, but the benefit of more pleasant surroundings  available to the latter is not.)
This argument suggests that any argument for adjustments on  account of state and
local taxes  would  need to  be premised upon  the offsetting locational  benefit being
higher wages rather than lower living costs or other, nonpecuniary benefits; moreover,
the argument for an adjustment depends on the higher crime leading to higher wages,
without regard to whether the jurisdiction also levies additional taxes to combat crime.
66Note that the differences could reflect entirely psychic costs.  For example, if the
costs of goods and services were the same in two regions but A was a less pleasant
place to live (and this  difference was not reflected  fully in lower land  prices in A),
wages  in A  might be  higher.  This  wage  difference  might then  be  deemed  a real
"cost-of-living"  difference.  Although  differences  in  psychic  benefits  of work  are
usually ignored, they do affect well-being, and  in the case just described, they may be
measurable as a practical matter.  More precisely, the total differences  in economic
and psychic costs may be measurable, using the wage differential, and in theory there
may be no reason  to  distinguish the two.  For a discussion of wage differentials  as
measuring  the value  of differences  in  amenities,  see  Sherwin  Rosen,  Wage-based
Indexes  of Urban Quality  of Life, in Current Issues in Urban Economics 542 (Peter
Mieszkowski  & Mahlon Straszheim  eds., 1979).
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differences  rather  than  other  cost differences.  Available  evi-
dence does not, however, provide confidence in the feasibility of
such an endeavor.67
The  federal  income  tax  does  not  provide  regional
cost-of-living  adjustments.  It  seems  plausible  that  real
cost-of-living  differences  are  more  significant  than  tax  differ-
ences (that do not reflect payment for higher benefits available
in a region).  In addition, Parts II and III suggest that tax differ-
ences may be far more difficult to identify and measure, particu-
larly in light of difficulties  in tracing  benefits and  determining
the  incidence  of  state  and  local  taxes.  Thus,  one  might  be
tempted to argue by analogy that there should be no deductibil-
ity or other adjustments for state and local taxes.  But the failure
to provide  cost-of-living adjustments has not been carefully de-
fended, so the issue can hardly be resolved so readily.
I1.  INCIDENCE:  BENEFIT VIEW VERSUS  NEW VIEW
Public finance  economists'  analysis  of state and local  taxing
and spending  is  concerned  with the questions  of how the level
and type  of taxes  and  expenditures  are  determined  and  how
these  public  sector  activities  influence  private  behavior.  The
problems  are interconnected:  the mobility of capital  and labor
will influence taxing and spending decisions and these decisions
will influence mobility.  Although the analysis  has not been de-
signed for the purpose of illuminating the question of deductibil-
ity, both  equity and  efficiency  aspects  of the problem  can be
assessed by reference to this work on the local public sector.68
Sections A and B examine the assumptions  and implications
for deductibility  of the benefit view and so-called  new view of
the property tax.69  Section C addresses how similar analysis is
relevant to sales and income taxes.  (Although the property tax
is used primarily  by local  governments,  whereas  sales  and  in-
67 See Kaplow, supra note 53, at 21-23.
69 Standard references are cited supra note 9.  Recitations  in Sections A and B of
basic points from this literature omit what would otherwise be repetitive citations.  In
addition, most of the refinements in this literature must be ignored in a project such
as  this for  ease  of exposition;  many  are surveyed  in the  standard  references  cited
previously.
69 See also supra note  14 (discussing old  view).
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come taxes are used primarily by state governments, the princi-
ples do not depend  directly on the level of government.  None-
theless, the results may.differ  due to differences  in the amount
of mobility and because  of a hierarchical relationship: mobility
is less  between  states than  between  localities,70 and states  set
rules for localities and may engage in fiscal equalization among
localities.)
A.  Benefit View
1.  The Simple Benefit View
The benefit  view  describes  a  scenario  in  which  individuals
choose  among  competing  jurisdictions  much  as  they  choose
among competitive suppliers of goods and services.  In the per-
fectly competitive scenario, associated with Tiebout,71 there is a
precise match between preferences for public services  and loca-
tions.  Thus, all residents of a given jurisdiction will have identi-
cal preferences  and pay identical taxes.  In the simplest models,
these would be head taxes  (also called lump-sum taxes or poll
taxes).  The tax would be an entrance fee for access to the juris-
diction's services, analogous to dues for membership in a private
club.72
In this scenario,  taxes will equal benefits in all jurisdictions,
so the first benchmark  case in Part I would apply,  and no de-
ductibility  would  seem  appropriate.  Of course, the stated  as-
sumptions  hardly  hold perfectly.  But  one might  believe  that
they are approximately true in the long run.73  As with private
goods, the competitive story only requires comparison shopping
by a sufficient portion of individuals to discipline  the market. 74
70  See, e.g., Oates, supra note  9, at 139.
71  Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 65 J. Pol. Econ. 416
(1956).
72 For an introductory discussion of the economic theory of clubs and  its relation-
ship to Tiebout's voting-with-the-feet analysis,  see Dennis C. Mueller, supra note 61,
ch.  9.
73 For a survey of some of the evidence bearing on mobility and the availability of
community  choice, see id. at 168-70.  For recent empirical evidence, see Thomas J.
Nechyba,  Fiscal Federalism  and Local  Public  Finance: A  General Equilibrium  Ap-
proach with Voting, 1994 Proc.  of the Nat'l Tax Ass'n 136,  140  (1995).
74 See Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Im-
perfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630  (1979).
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Also,  one might imagine  that preferences  for  levels  of public
services  tend to be rather similar among those  of the same  in-
come, and in many areas there  is substantial segregation by in-
come among local jurisdictions.75
In addition,  each jurisdiction  chooses the taxes  and benefits
it provides, so taxes and benefits will tend to reflect inhabitants'
preferences.  For example, it may be that, because of the limited
number of jurisdictions in an area or because of preferences for
heterogeneity  in  living  arrangements,  residents'  incomes  vary.
If head taxes  are used to  finance  equal benefits for everyone,
this would not raise a problem.  If property taxes are imposed,
as is usually the case, wealthier residents will pay higher taxes. 76
7s  For references to empirical evidence on sorting, see Keith Dowding, Peter John
& Stephen  Biggs, Tiebout:  A Survey  of the Empirical Literature, 31  Urb. Stud.  767
(1994),  and Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 1669 n.20.
76  If property taxes are not required, analysis of the new view, see infra Section B,
implies that head  taxes would be chosen  (assuming that uniform benefits  are to  be
financed).  See Mieszkowski & Zodrow, supra note 9, at 1111-13; George R. Zodrow
& Peter  Mieszkowski,  The  New  View  of the  Property Tax:  A  Reformulation,  16
Regional Sci. & Urb. Econ. 309,  312-13  (1986);  see also J. Vernon Henderson,  Will
Homeowners  Impose Property Taxes?, 25 Reg. Sci. & Urb. Econ. 153 (1995)  (arguing
that  in  properly specified  Tiebout  model,  homeowner-residents  would  not choose
property taxes); Russel R. Krelove, The Persistence and Inefficiency of Property Tax
Finance  of Local  Public Expenditures,  51  J. Pub.  Econ. 415  (1993)  (stating that if
direct taxes on residents are unavailable, property taxes rather than land taxes would
be used).
This raises the interesting question of why localities use property taxes rather than
head  taxes.  One explanation  is  that states might require the  use of local property
taxes because political  forces at the state level of the sort examined in Part IV favor
greater redistribution.  But the intrajurisdictional  redistribution induced by property
taxation is  a curious result to be pursued by a state.  For example, the middle-class
who live in wealthy jurisdictions benefit and the middle-class who live in poor jurisdic-
tions  lose.  Also,  the extent  of redistribution  is undermined  by  mobility,  which  is
greater for local jurisdictions within the state than for the state as a whole.  Of course,
the property  tax is  deductible  whereas some alternatives  would not be.  See I.R.C.
§ 164(a) (1994).  (And the property tax is closer  to a head tax than sales or income
taxes, especially for  localities with  importing-exporting issues.  State-level  property
taxes could be used instead, but states may be reluctant on administrative grounds to
employ such taxes because each locality would have  an incentive to under-assess and
state administered  assessment may be more difficult.)  But prior to 1964, all state and
local taxes were  deductible, so deductibility  seems  a poor historical  explanation for
selection of the property tax.  There are some enforcement problems with head taxes
(as  when  individuals purport  to live  elsewhere  when  they  are actually  living  with
friends or relatives  in a high-tax, high-benefit jurisdiction),  whereas property is easy
to identify.  It is not clear, however, that enforcement  is a significant  impediment.
Some expensive  benefits-notably, public education-can  readily be limited to chil-
dren of adult residents who have  paid their head tax.  Also, taxes could be imposed
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But the political process or constraints imposed by the potential
out-migration of the wealthy and in-migration of the poor may
lead the jurisdiction to provide a mix  of public goods and ser-
vices that is more valuable to the wealthy.77
on  residences  independent of  their value.  Alternatively,  greater  reliance  on  user
charges,  although it involves  some  additional  administrative  cost,  would  often be
feasible.  Henderson  suggests  that homeowner-residents  would  not prefer property
taxes  and argues  that the substantial decline in the use of property taxes since 1950
might be explained by the concurrent increase in home ownership over the subsequent
time period.
Of some relevance is the unsuccessful recent experience of Britain in substituting
a poll  tax  (head  tax) for a  property tax to  finance  local government.  Peter Smith,
Lessons from the British Poll Tax Disaster, 44 Nat'l Tax J. 421 (1991),  analyzes rea-
sons  for this  failure; it appears, however, that many are not obviously  inherent and
some reflect that the property tax was  already in place.  See also Robert Bowles &
Philip Jones, Nonpayment of Poll Tax:  An Exploratory Analysis of Tax Resistance,
13 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 445 (1993)  (examining factors influencing nonpayment of the
poll tax).  The British poll tax was subject to mass evasion, see Timothy Besley,  Ian
Preston, and Michael Ridge, Fiscal Anarchy in the U.K.: Modeling Poll Tax Noncom-
pliance (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4498, 1993), but
this reflects at least in part some of the peculiar circumstances  described by Smith and
the fact that the government at the time did not impose  sanctions for nonpayment
(and  this was well  known).  Finally,  if the incidence of local benefits  more closely
matched the incidence of the long-existing property taxes rather than that of the new
poll tax, see infra note 77, the resulting disruption to the economic and political equi-
librium might have induced opposition.
Fischel argues  that any requirement to use a property tax could be repealed  (for
example, state constitutions are often amended); thus, one should infer that property
taxes are relatively efficient because this has not happened.  See William A. Fischel,
Property Taxation and the Tiebout Model:  Evidence for the Benefit View from Zon-
ing and Voting, 30 J. Econ. Lit. 171,  175 (1992).  It has been suggested that property
taxes may be more attractive than head taxes because of the better incentives provided
to local governments under the former. See Edward L. Glaeser, The Incentive Effects
of Property Taxes on Local  Governments  (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working  Paper No. 4987, 1995).  Relatedly,  land taxes--or property taxes, because
they apply to land value as well-allow local governments to extract the value of local
amenities, some of which are produced  using the tax revenues.  See  also infra notes
77, 101 and  102 (indicating that, in practice,  the benefits financed  by property taxes
favor those who pay more and property tax payments are adjusted to reflect benefits
received).
77 According to Rubinfeld, available evidence indicates that local taxes are some-
what regressive and spending somewhat pro-rich,  a pattern in which taxes paid may
be close to the value of public goods and services received.  See Rubinfeld, supra note
9, at 630-31; see also W. Irwin Gillespie, Effect of Public Expenditures on the Distri-
bution of Income, in Essays in Fiscal Federalism 122 (Richard A. Musgrave ed., 1965)
(finding  some redistribution  in favor  of the  lowest-income  groups  and an approxi-
mately neutral net effect-taxes  equal to public benefits-at higher income levels for
state and local taxes and some expenditures);  Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 9 (argu-
ing that legal strategies designed to increase redistribution at the local level will have
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This  competitive scenario  is vulnerable  to criticism. 78  First,
the assumptions are questionable.7 9  Jurisdictional choice is lim-
ited,  due  to  economies  of  scale  or  historical  accident.80
Mobility-particularly  out  of cities  or between states-may be
constrained.8'  Political processes that determine taxes and spen-
ding  do not  perfectly  reflect  residents'  wishes, which  are  not
well-defined in the presence of heterogeneity.  Second, property
taxes rather than user charges or head taxes are commonly used
in local finance.  Although more expensive property may benefit
more from some government services, many doubt that benefits
vary to the extent of tax differences.  It is still possible, however,
that the benefit view is correct, as the next Subsection explains.
2.  Perfect Capitalization
The power  of the perfect  capitalization  ideas2  can  be illus-
trated using the assumptions  of the second benchmark case, in
which all residents receive equal benefits from the public sector,
whereas tax payments differ.  In particular, with a property tax,
those living  in more  expensive homes  pay more tax.  It might
appear, therefore,  that an  adjustment  (deduction  for high-tax
and inclusion for low-tax residents)  is appropriate.
limited success); infra note 102.  One study of property tax incidence in Great Britain
before implementation of poll taxes (see supra note 76) suggests that the incidence of
benefits was closer to the incidence of the property tax than that of the poll tax.  See
Glen Bramley, Julian LeGrand & William Low, How Far Is the Poll Tax a 'Commu-
nity Charge'? The Implications of Service Usage Evidence, 17 Pol'y & Pol. 187 (1989).
(Given the many problems the study has in establishing incidence, its result should be
viewed  as merely suggestive.)  See also infra Subsection  B.3 and note 101.
With regard to demographic  redistribution, see supra Subsection  I.B.4, a conver-
gence of taxes and benefits may be approximated by bundling increased expenditures
on schools (benefiting younger families)  with increased  expenditures on programs for
the elderly.
78 See generally Dowding et al.,  supra note 75 (surveying empirical  literature  on
assumptions  and implications of Tiebout's model).
79 See, e.g., Billman  & Cunningham, supra note  6, at 1113.
80 See, e.g., Bruce W. Hamilton, A Review: Is the Property Tax a Benefit Tax?, in
Zodrow, supra note 9, at 85,
81  See, e.g., Oates, supra note 9, at 139.
82 See, e.g., Bruce W. Hamilton, Capitalization of Intrajurisdictional Differences in
Local Tax Prices, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. 743 (1976);  Mieszkowski & Zodrow, supra note
9, at 1100,  1107-1110.
HeinOnline -- 82 Va. L. Rev.  445 1996Virginia Law Review
This argument, however, ignores the effect of the property tax
on housing values.  If the quantity of housing is fixed, one would
expect property values fully to adjust on account of the property
tax.  Thus, if living in an expensive home required that one pay
an  additional  $10,000  in property  taxes  (measured  in present
value) above the value of any local public benefits, the value of
that home to a prospective buyer would be $10,000 less on that
account.  Housing prices would adjust to reflect this difference.
Similarly, buyers  of inexpensive  homes in a jurisdiction  would
face the prospect of receiving benefits at a charge less than their
worth; hence, such homes would be more valuable to this extent,
and the price of such homes would be higher.  As a result, the
total housing costs of individuals  in each group would be unaf-
fected in equilibrium.  Those who choose to purchase expensive
homes pay more in taxes but have lower imputed rental  costs;
the reverse is true for buyers of less-expensive homes.  For rent-
ers, the story is  similar.  Landlords  who rent expensive  homes
would have higher tax costs but lower capital costs; the converse
would be true for less-expensive  homes.83
In sum, if perfect capitalization prevails, property taxes do not
measure  benefits,  but property  taxes plus  adjustments  in  the
capital cost of housing do equal benefits.  Arguably, no deduct-
ibility would be appropriate: everyone in the jurisdiction receiv-
ing equal benefits bears the same total cost (property taxes plus
capital cost adjustments),  which just equals the benefits.84
83  Although one normally would expect rent to reflect property taxes, when individ-
uals are mobile  rents  will reflect  only  the value  of public benefits  associated  with
residence.  Thus, renters will get what they pay for. Landlords paying taxes in excess
of benefits will suffer from a lower return, so their property will be worth less.  If the
landlord bought the  property after  the tax was  in place,  this  will be reflected  in a
lower purchase  price, just  as  with  owner-occupiers  (whose  situation  is  simply  the
combination  of the effect on landlords and the effect on renters).
84  The perfect capitalization argument focuses  on the equilibrium prevailing after
property taxes are in effect.  Because property taxes have existed for a long period  of
time and usually are changed only gradually, this perspective may be appropriate.  But
at the  time the property  tax is  enacted  or changed,  there  will be capital  gains  and
losses to the  extent that  the event  is not entirely anticipated.  See generally  Louis
Kaplow,  An Economic  Analysis  of Legal Transitions, 99  Harv. L. Rev.  509,  515-19
(1986)  (discussing transition  effects from  legal reforms).  The tax system takes such
gains and losses into account, although imperfectly due to the realization requirement,
I.R.C. § 1001(c)  (1994),  special treatment of capital gains, I.R.C.  § 1(h), and  forgive-
ness of capital gains on death, I.R.C. § 1014.  For homeowners in particular, there is
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There are, however, two important caveats.  First, if there is
perfect capitalization,  deductibility itself would also be capital-
ized.  (Deductibility would reduce  the effective cost of the tax,
so the property value adjustments would be less in an offsetting
manner.)  Therefore, under perfect capitalization, the choice of
rule arguably is irrelevant for measuring ability to pay. 85
Second, it is  not clear  that perfect  capitalization  often  de-
scribes reality.  As will be discussed at greater length in the next
Section (on the new view of the property tax), one would expect
the amount  of capital  to adjust in the long run.  Thus, if the
property tax rate is higher, individuals would choose  to build,
rebuild,  or maintain  homes  of somewhat  lower  value.  If the
capital stock is fully adjustable, the new view prevails, and the
preceding analysis is inapplicable.
Communities  may, however, attempt to prevent adjustments
of  the  capital  stock  through  zoning  and  related  restrictions.
When equal benefits  are financed by a property tax, communi-
ties will fear that individuals will attempt to secure those bene-
fits cheaply by building low-cost housing or increasing the occu-
pancy  of existing housing.  To prevent  this, existing  residents
have  an incentive  to impose minimum  lot  and square-foot re-
quirements, limits on multiple occupancy, and charges on devel-
also the rollover possibility, I.R.C. § 1034, and one-time forgiveness, I.R.C.§  121.  Loss
limitations may be important for those who own property subject to taxes that exceed
benefits.  For homeowners,  losses are not deductible  because  they are personal, al-
though there may be de facto deductibility to the extent the loss offsets what would
otherwise have been capital gains.  In sum, because losses are not deductible and gains
will generally not be realized or will be forgiven, the regime applicable to homeowners
is approximately  one of ignoring capital gains and  losses from housing.  As a result,
providing a property tax deduction-or, more particularly, the sorts of deductions and
inclusions  described  for the second  benchmark  in  Section B-might be seen as  an
indirect way of accounting for such gains or losses.  (For homeowners  who sell after
a tax change, the sales price will reflect deductibility and thus the price movement will
be less, so the tax deduction will mitigate the extent of the capital gain or loss actually
borne by the taxpayer in a manner similar to what would result if the gain or loss were
instead accounted for directly.)  It is not clear, however, what policy would lead one
generally  to ignore capital  gains and  losses on homes but to account for  them indi-
rectly to the extent they were due to property tax changes but not other factors.  See
also infra Subsection B.4 (inelastic supply of land under the new view).
95  For any of the rules concerning  deductibility, the caveats  in note 84 apply.  In
addition, in a system with  graduated rates,  the capitalization  of federal  income  tax
effects will be complicated because different market participants will value tax benefits
differently.  Finally, there would remain  efficiency effects.  See infra Section VI.
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opers  (as in charges for  streets and utility connections  and re-
quirements to create public parks as part of a project).  If such
restrictions are perfectly  binding, individuals  cannot pay lower
property taxes by acquiring less housing, and perfect capitaliza-
tion will occur.  If not, the analysis of the new view will be more
relevant.
86
B.  New View
1.  Explanation
The new view of the property tax emphasizes the mobility of
capital  and concludes  that  owners of capital bear the property
tax, although differences in property tax rates have effects simi-
lar to those of an excise tax. 87  To illustrate the argument, sup-
pose initially  that the return  to  capital  (interest  rate)  is  10%.
The relevant world  consists of two identical  towns, neither  of
which has a property tax.  Suppose that one of the towns then
enacts a property tax at a rate of 2%.88
86 See,  e.g.,  Fischel,  supra  note  76;  Mieszkowski  & Zodrow,  supra  note  9,  at
1112-13,  1140.
87 This view was initially developed by Procter Thompson, The Property Tax and
the Rate  of Interest, in The American Property  Tax 111  (George  C.S. Benson,  H.
McClelland  & P.  Thomas  eds.,  1965),  Peter  Mieszkowski,  The  Property  Tax:  An
Excise Tax or a Profits Tax?, 1 J. Pub. Econ. 73  (1972),  and Henry J. Aaron, Who
Pays  the Property Tax?  (1975).  For  an accessible  discussion  of the literature,  see
McLure, supra note 14.
88 The analysis considers the case in which one town  has a property tax at a given
rate and another town has no tax. The analysis is the same-although the magnitudes
differ-when  both  towns  have  positive taxes,  but at different rates.  The  analysis
focuses on differences  in property  tax rates, abstracting from effects of the average
rate.  Under the new view-that is, assuming capital mobility-the effect of the aver-
age tax rate is to reduce the return to capital to that extent.  (In the example in the
text, the average  rate of 1%-one  town's rate is 2%  and the other's is 0%-is re-
flected in the return to capital falling from 10%  to 9%.  See  infra Subsection 2.a.)
The example  also implicitly  assumes that all capital is housing in the two towns.
(Property taxation  of business  property is addressed  in Part III.)  The  logic of the
analysis implies that the average return on all capital, of whatever type and wherever
located, would fall.  Thus, the town with no tax can be taken as a proxy for the rest
of the world in which capital is not subject to the property tax-or in which any taxes
are taken as given when the property tax in the first town is introduced.  It remains
the case  that a relatively higher tax burden on capital in the first town  will produce
an excise  effect,  requiring  in  equilibrium  a  higher gross rent  to  the extent  of the
difference.
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The immediate effect of the town's property tax appears to be
that the return to residential  capital in the  town would fall to
8%.  But in the long run the amount of capital invested in such
a town would fall:  investors  will prefer the  10%  return  in the
town with no property tax to the 8%  return in the town with the
tax.  As capital falls  in the town with the tax, rents per unit of
capital will rise; similarly, as capital rises in the town without the
tax, the return will fall relative to the original return.  This pro-
cess will continue until the rates of return are equal in the two
towns-say, at 9%.89
Finally,  consider  the  equilibrium  level  of rents.  If the  net
return to capital in the town with the property tax is 9%, it must
be that rents have risen sufficiently to provide a gross return of
11%,  so that after payment of the 2%  property tax the capital
owner will net 9%.  In the town without the property tax, rents
will be sufficient to yield 9%.  Thus, gross rental rates-the cost
to residents per unit of housing-are higher in the town with the
property tax, which is consistent with the reduction in capital in
that town.
2.  Appropriate Treatment
a.  Landlords
Consider  capital owners who are landlords (that is, who  are
not owner-occupiers).  Those who own capital in the town with-
out a property tax now earn  9%  rather than 10%.  This reduc-
tion in return is already reflected in the gross rents they receive,
so these  rents will properly  reflect gross income.  (Thus, even
though they bear some of the burden of the property tax in the
other town, there  is no need for a deduction for the taxes they
do not pay directly; their gross rent is lower by an amount that
reflects  the burden they bear.)  Those who  own  capital in the
89 This  process will take  time, but property  taxes have  existed  for decades  and
unanticipated  rate changes  tend to be modest.  The  equilibrium  rate of return  will
depend, among other things, on the amount of capital  initially in each town and the
elasticity of demand for capital in each town.  The analysis to follow does not depend
on the particular equilibrium rate of return.  Also, if one considered an actual  world
of many towns (rather than only two, as assumed here) and only a single town imple-
mented a property tax, the average return to capital would fall a very small amount,
with virtually the entire amount of the tax being reflected  in higher rents.
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town  with the  2%  property tax  have  a net return  of  9% but
receive  rents  sufficient to provide  an 11%  gross return.  Their
income  is  properly  measured  by  allowing  a deduction  for the
property tax.90
b.  Renters
As  a whole, renters  benefit  from the property  tax:  because
owners of capital bear the burden of the property tax, the return
on capital falls to 9%, so housing becomes cheaper, the capital
costing 9%  rather than  10%.91  For those in the town without
the property tax, rents fall.  Those in the town with the property
tax pay higher gross rents, but their town now has the revenue
from the property tax.  If one assumes that these tax revenues
provide residents with benefits that are equal to their costs, then
on average  renters pay  11%  and receive  benefits  of 2%,  for a
net capital cost of 9%.92
In addition, there is a reallocation of capital that is inefficient:
relative to the actual cost of capital, residents in the town with
the property tax face a high price and use too little capital, and
those in the town without the tax face a low price and use too
much capital.93  That residents  in the town  with the tax face a
high price is not inconsistent with the fact that, on average, their
90 They bear 1%  (their net return  is now  9%  rather  than 10%),  but their gross
return has  risen  1%  (from  10%  to  11%),  so  a deduction  of 2%  (which  equals  the
amount of the property tax paid) provides the correct result.
91  Owner-occupiers are worse off in their capacity as landlords (capital owners) but
are better off as renters.  See infra Subsection c.
92 The  benefit to renters-in  both towns the net rental  price  is  9%  rather than
10%-is similar to  the benefit that arises when  the cost of capital  falls for  reasons
unrelated to  the property tax.
93 The effect of higher property taxes on average  (as distinguished from relatively
high rates in a particular jurisdiction) is to increase the price of housing (assuming that
housing capital is subject to the tax but other capital is not, see supra note 88), which
would result in inefficiently  low housing consumption.  But if housing is  otherwise
excessively consumed,  perhaps  because  the income  tax  excludes  imputed  rent and
corporate  capital  is  taxed  more  heavily  than  noncorporate  capital,  the  distortion
caused by higher property taxes may be efficiency-enhancing.  See, e.g., S. Devarajan,
D. Fullerton & R.A. Musgrave, Estimating the Distribution of Tax Burdens: A Com-
parison of Different Approaches,  13 J. Pub. Econ.  155, 169-171  (1980).  For a discus-
sion of the distinction between the differences in tax rates and the average tax rate for
assessing the efficiency  consequences of property taxation,  see Wildasin, supra note
9,  at 111-13.
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net burden is only 9%  rather than 11%,  on account  of the 2%
public benefit.  Each resident's public benefit is assumed to be
independent  of the size of her home;94 hence, by reducing con-
sumption of housing, residents keep the same benefits but  re-
duce their housing costs.  The relevant marginal  cost of housing
is  11%.
Now consider the differential effect among renters in the town
with the property tax.  Suppose that residents' benefits are inde-
pendent  of their housing  consumption.  Then,  those in  large
homes implicitly pay taxes in excess of the benefits they receive,
and those in small homes bear an implicit tax burden that is less
than the benefits they receive.  For example, if half the residents
live in $100,000 houses  and half in $200,000 houses, the former
group pays, through higher rents,  $2,000 in property taxes, and
the latter group pays $4,000.  Publicly funded benefits per capita
are $3,000.
This case fits the second benchmark in Part I.  If the second
benchmark  dictates  appropriate  treatment,95  it  suggests  that
those who rent large houses should have a $1,000 deduction and
those  who  rent  small  houses  should  have  a  $1,000  inclusion.
This is the result given by the formula which permits a deduc-
tion of Ti - T:  here, Ti equals  $4,000 for those  in large homes
and  $2,000  for those  in small homes;  T  equals  $3,000.  These
deductions  and inclusions  apply to renters despite the fact that
they do not pay the tax directly, because they implicitly pay the
tax through higher rents.  Indeed, the effects would be no differ-
ent  if  the  property  tax  were  imposed  directly  on  renters.96
94 To the extent that the benefit is  not independent  of the amount of capital in-
vested but rather is, say, increasing  with the level of capital,  the property tax would
be a benefits tax, and the return to capital would not decrease on this account.  Then,
the benefit view rather than the new view would be partially applicable.
95  The treatment  given by the second benchmark is subject to all of the qualifica-
tions noted in Part I.  For example, if benefits are not equal but rather are a function
of property  values,  any  adjustment  must be  modified accordingly.  Moreover,  the
discussion  in Section  I.C  questions whether even  the limited deductions  (and  inclu-
sions)  implied  by  the second  benchmark  are appropriate,  even without  regard  to
factual qualifications.
96  New York State amended  its property tax law so that the tax was nominally on
renters rather than landlords, but the IRS  did not permit renters to deduct the tax, a
result it attempted to justify by arguing that the new law did not in fact transfer the
obligation  from owners to renters.  Rev. Rul. 79-180, 1979-1  C.B.  95.  The fact that
current law bases  deductibility  on who is formally responsible for the tax payments
1996]
HeinOnline -- 82 Va. L. Rev.  451 1996Virginia Law Review
(Owners'  gross rents would be lower by the amount  of the tax
but their net return on capital would be the same; renters would
pay less rent but more tax, yielding the same total outlay.)
To verify this result-which may seem counterintuitive-com-
pare, for example, renters  of $200,000 homes in the town with
the tax to renters of $200,000 homes in the town without the tax.
The former pay higher rent  in the  amount  of the tax, $4,000.
(Recall that this  must be true in equilibrium, in which  the net
return  to capital is equal in both towns.)  The former also re-
ceive benefits of $3,000.  In total, therefore, renters in the town
with the tax are worse off by $1,000, which explains  the $1,000
deduction  implied  by the  formula for  the second  benchmark
case.
c.  Owner-Occupiers
Consider  capital owners  who are owner-occupiers.  In their
capacity as owners (renting to themselves), owner-occupiers have
the  same  2%  expense  as  true  landlords  (non-
owner-occupiers)-$2,000  for a $100,000  house.  But they also
receive  imputed  rent  sufficient  to  provide  an  11%  gross
return-$11,000-which  is not taxed.  Otherwise similarly situ-
ated owner-occupiers  in the town without the property tax pay
no property tax but receive  imputed rent sufficient  to provide
only a 9%  return-9000.  Thus, owner-occupiers  who pay prop-
erty tax-$2,000-have  higher imputed  gross  rent in the same
amount-$11,000  rather  than  $9,000.  As  a result,  it  may  be
argued  that no  deduction  should be provided  to those  in the
town  with  the  property  tax  if  owner-occupiers  of  equal-cost
houses  are  to  have  the  same  amount  of imputed  income  ex-
cluded.
9 7
even  in  settings where little  of economic substance  turns  on the formal  distinction
suggests  that the existing rule is misguided.  This shortcoming  of the existing  legal
distinction,  however,  does not indicate  whether  the deduction should  be denied  to
owners,  extended to renters, or otherwise adjusted.
97 As owners of capital, owner-occupiers  receive a net return of 9%  regardless of
the town  in which  they  live.  In principle such imputed  income  should  be  taxable
though in pra'ctice it is not.  But, as long as no property tax deduction is allowed, the
failure to tax imputed income does not differentiate owner-occupiers in the two towns:
excluded net income is 9%  in either case.
Although not undertaking a complete analysis, many commentators have suggested
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This  argument  is  incomplete  because  it  focuses  on
owner-occupiers  solely in their role  as owners of capital  (land-
lords).  As occupiers  of their homes,  their situation  is like that
of renters.  If they live in a town with a 2%  property tax, they
pay more rent and receive public benefits.  As a whole, there-
fore,  owner-occupiers  in  the  town  with  the  property  tax  are
worse off than those in the town without the tax if they live in
an expensive house and better off if they live in an inexpensive
house.  A deduction  (or inclusion)  given by Ti - T would mea-
sure this effect as in the case of renters.
To summarize,  imputing rent eliminates what may otherwise
seem to be basis for deduction by the recipient-owner, and im-
puting the property tax payment creates an argument for adjust-
that the failure to tax imputed rental income from housing is a reason for disallowing
deduction of the property tax; relatedly, it is suggested, often implicitly, that a deduc-
tion may be proper if imputed  rent were taxed.  See, e.g., Bradford  & the U.S. Trea-
sury Tax Policy Staff, supra note 1, at 84; Richard Goode, The Individual  Income Tax
171  (rev. ed.  1976); Vickrey, supra note 25, at 22; William F. Hellmuth, Homeowner
Preferences, in Comprehensive  Income Taxation, supra note 23, at 163, 179-81; Rich-
ard Pomp, Mortgage Interest and Property Tax Deduction: A Tax Expenditure Analy-
sis, 1 Can. Tax'n 23, 24-25 (Fall 1979).  The discussion in the text supports this sugges-
tion because differences  in property tax payments  will correspond  to differences  in
imputed income that are excluded  from the tax base.  The argument in the text to
follow, however, indicates that such reasoning is incomplete because homeowners  are
also occupiers.
An analogy to the problem  of excluding  imputed rent from  housing is suggested
by Hulten and Schwab's observation that the imputed income from the public capital
stock also is not taxed.  See Hulten & Schwab, supra note 20.  In this respect, the tax
system favors public rather  than private  sector activity as  long as the public sector
owns rather than rents capital.  Note that this favoritism is independent of the differ-
ence between  the way the income  tax treats  homeowners and renters.  Hulten and
Schwab argue that neutrality in a simple Tiebout model-in which property taxes are
benefits taxes-requires no deduction of the property tax, taxation of imputed income
from public capital,  and taxation of the interest on government bonds.  Id.; see Paul
N.  Courant &  Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Tax  Reform:  Implications  for the  State-Local
Public Sector, 1 J. Econ. Persp. 87, 97-98 (Summer 1987); Roger H. Gordon & Gilbert
E. Metcalf, Do Tax-Exempt Bonds Really Subsidize Municipal Capital?, 44 Nat'l Tax
J. 71 (1991);  Roger H. Gordon & Joel Slemrod, A General Equilibrium Simulation
Study  of Subsidies  to  Municipal  Expenditures,  38 J. Fin.  585  (1983)  (showing that
elimination  of the  property  tax  deduction  increases  efficiency  substantially-main
distortions  are in housing and the local public sector, and efficiency gains from elimi-
nation are large enough that even wealthy homeowners gain; elimination of municipal
bond interest exemption does much less, because municipalities would shift to deduct-
ible property tax financing). Helen F. Ladd, Federal Aid to State and Local Govern-
ments, in Federal  Budget Policy  in the 1980s,  at 165,  197-201  (Gregory  B.  Mills  &
John L. Palmer eds.,  1984).
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ment by the payor-occupier.  This perspective suggests that any
argument for deducting taxes, to measure properly the extent to
which benefits may not equal tax payments, should focus on the
homeowner as occupier-renter  and resident-rather  than as an
owner of capital.
For all renters, imputed and actual, there remains the  ques-
tion whether any adjustment should be made under the circum-
stances described here. That is, does the treatment suggested for
the second benchmark follow from its assumptions?  The focus
here on renters-consumers of housing-suggests a problem with
the argument of the sort described in Section I.C.  For the same
public goods  and services,  some consumers  (those who choose
more expensive homes) are paying a price higher than that paid
by other  consumers  (those who  choose less expensive  homes).
The  income  tax  does  not  ordinarily  make  adjustments  when
some consumers get better deals than others-for example, when
someone buys a microwave  oven  on sale or at a less expensive
store or when beaches are free in some places but subject to fees
in others.98  Relatedly, the largest component of most individu-
als'  cost of living, housing costs, differs significantly across juris-
dictions, but, as previously noted, the income tax does not adjust
for cost-of-living  differences.
3.  Relationship between Taxes and Benefits under the New View
The  discussion  in  Subsection 2  takes  as given that tax pay-
ments  and  the  value  of  benefits  received  may  systematically
differ under the new view.  But this need not be the case.  Some
public benefits directly concern residential property.  Others may
be positively correlated with income,99 which in turn is correlated
with housing expenditures. 1 00  Mobility may create pressure for
public benefits  to be structured  in a manner that matches  the
98  See, e.g., Klein,  supra note  50, at 884; J.B.  McCombs,  Refining  the Itemized
Deduction  for Home Property Tax Payments, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 317, 322-23  (1991).
99 This may be due in part to income effects: identical goods and services may have
a higher monetary  value to those with more income.  See supra note 33.
100  For evidence  on  the positive  correlation  between  spending  on  housing  and
income, see Stephen K. Mayo, Theory and  Estimation in the Economics of Housing
Demand,  10 J. Urb. Econ.  95  (1981).
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distribution of different residents' tax payments.101  In addition,
tax obligations may be modified to approximate  benefits more
closely.10 2  Thus,  the new view does not in itself imply that the
second benchmark rather than the first is applicable.
This  qualification  may  appear  confusing,  for  it might  seem
that, if benefits  equaled taxes, the benefit view of the property
tax rather than the new view would be applicable.  But the new
view of the property tax  is not directly  addressed  to whether
taxes equal benefits.  Instead, it concerns whether the incidence
of the tax is on capital, a related but different  question.103  As
Subsection A.2 explains, the applicability of the benefit view of
the property tax-the perfect capitalization  version  in particu-
lar-depends  on whether zoning  and other restrictions prevent
capital from adjusting to changes in the rate of return caused by
the property  tax.  If restrictions  are  binding,  capital  does  not
adjust,  so  the  property  tax  is  capitalized  into  housing  prices.
Those who pay more taxes relative to public benefits pay less for
homes  in a corresponding  amount.  The net effect is that taxes
plus housing cost adjustments equal benefits.  In sum, under the
benefit view, it is  necessarily true that there will not be differ-
ences  in well-being that arise from discrepancies between taxes
paid and benefits  received.
If capital can adjust-as posited under the new view-Subsec-
tion 1 explains  how net rates of return will be equalized across
jurisdictions.  Those who buy expensive homes will not benefit
from  a lower cost  of capital;  gross rents will  be higher  to the
extent  of the property tax.  Thus, individuals who  wish to buy
expensive  homes  in  a jurisdiction  will  bear the burden  of the
101 See supra note 77; Mieszkowski & Zodrow, supra note 9, at 1099-1100, 1111-12.
102  See,  e.g.,  Fischel, supra note  76, at 176  (noting, for  example, that  owners  of
farmland  and  other  open  spaces,  as  well  as  elderly  taxpayers-who  do  not  use
schools-often have reduced tax burdens); Dong Hoon Chun & Peter Linneman, An
Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Intrajurisdictional Property Tax Payment
Inequities,  18 J. Urb. Econ. 90 (1985)  (finding negative relationship  between house
value and effective tax rates); Inman & Rubinfeld,  supra note 9, at 1680 (stating that
in central cities, high-income residential properties are assessed at a lower percentage
of true market value).
103  See, e.g., John Yinger, Howard S. Bloom, Axel Borsch-Supan, & Helen F. Ladd,
Property Taxes  and  House  Values  134  (1988)  ("Even  with  full  capitalization,  the
property tax rate in the reference jurisdiction affects the 'before-tax'  price of housing
services and therefore introduces  a tax wedge into the housing market.").
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high property tax on such homes  even if public goods and ser-
vices  do not provide  high levels of benefits.  Thus, the central
force emphasized in the new view-the mobility of capital-does
not guarantee  that  taxes  will  equal  benefits.  Neither  does  it
guarantee  inequality:  choice  of location  and consequent  pres-
sures on taxes and public benefits may result in an approximate
equalization of taxes paid and benefits received, even if buying
a  marginally  larger  home  would increase  one's  tax payments
without increasing benefits.104
4.  Land versus Structures
As just explained, the new view is grounded in the assumption
that, at least in the long run, capital is mobile.  With regard to
housing, the idea is that decisions about the size and splendor of
homes  and  apartments  to be  built  as  well  as  decisions  about
maintenance and renovation will reflect the cost of capital, which
includes  the property  tax.  Even in the long run, however,  in
many local jurisdictions the supply of land will be rather inelas-
tic.105  When such land is subject to a property tax that does not
finance  benefits of equal value, the differential  will be capital-
ized into land values in the manner outlined in Subsection A.2
(describing  the  perfect  capitalization  version  of  the  benefit
view).106  Indeed,  as  a first approximation  it may be that the
benefit  view is  applicable  to the property tax  on land and the
new view to the property tax on structures.  Thus, when there is
capitalization, the effects will be borne by the landowners (whe-
104  It should be emphasized  that the distortion of capital markets that is the focus
of the new view depends upon the marginal effect whereas whether taxes equal bene-
fits can be viewed  as  depending upon an average  effect.  To illustrate, suppose  that
the value  of local benefits tends  to increase with  income at approximately the same
rate as the consumption of housing increases with income.  Then, a tax on housing will
result in approximate equality between taxes paid and benefits received.  As long as
the benefits do not accrue as a consequence of housing itself, however, residents have
an incentive to buy marginally cheaper homes because this would reduce tax obliga-
tions without reducing the value of benefits received.
105  The supply of land is  probably more  elastic  than one might initially suspect.
Zoning changes may affect land available for residential  use.  At the outer fringe of
urban areas, agricultural or other undeveloped  land may be converted to residential
use if the value in that use rises.  If residential land is less valuable due to property
taxation, there will be less conversion as populations grow.
106  See, e.g., Dick Netzer, Economics of the Property Tax 35  (1966).
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ther owner-occupiers or landlords) at the time an unanticipated
change  goes into effect,1 07 whereas  in the absence of capitaliza-
tion the property tax will affect the return on capital and rents
(imputed or explicit)  over time.108
5.  Evidence on the New View
An important  fact cited  in  support  of the new  view is that
zoning and other constraints do not seem to be binding.  If most
homes in a community exceed the relevant minimum standards,
it  is  suggested  that the regulations  do not  restrict  the exit  of
capital,  and the resulting  equilibrium therefore  must have the
characteristics  of the  new view.1 °9  Other restraints may, how-
ever, exist that make zoning binding despite this observation." 0
Although there  is empirical  evidence  concerning  how property
values are affected by the property tax,"'  it is difficult to infer
whether the benefit view  or new view is  valid." 2  Evidence  on
rental  rates," 3  as  well  as  evidence  regarding  the  relationship
107  See supra note 84 (discussing tax system's treatment of capital gains and losses
due to property tax capitalization).
108 See, e.g., Yinger et al., supra note 103, at 123, 135-36,  141-43.
109  See Mieszkowski  & Zodrow, supra note  9, at 1112-13,  1140.
110  See Fischel, supra note 76.
111  See, e.g., Dowding et al., supra note 75, at 775-79  (survey of literature on capi-
talization); Hamilton, supra note 80, at 90 (noting evidence of nearly complete capital-
ization and inferring support for the benefit view).  But see Yinger et al., supra note
103,  ch. 1  (finding incomplete  capitalization,  but indicating  that this  may be due to
anticipation that assessment differences may be temporary).  See also id. ch. 2 (survey-
ing studies and suggesting that capitalization  may be less than many indicate due to
studies'  use of too high a discount rate to convert annual tax payments into present
value).
112 See, e.g., Mieszkowski & Zodrow, supra note 9, at 1127-31; Wassmer, supra note
9, at 137-40.
113  See Robert J. Carroll & John Yinger, Is the Property Tax a Benefit Tax? The
Case of Rental Housing, 47 Nat'l Tax J. 295  (1994).  They find that residential land-
lords in the Boston area shift little of the property tax to tenants.  On this basis, they
claim that taxes do not match benefits.  Such evidence is also in tension with the new
view because it suggests that capital  is immobile.  Arguably, their evidence  suggests
that measured tax differences  do not correspond  to benefits, with the result that the
cost of tax  differences  must be capitalized into the price of land  (as implied  by the
perfect capitalization  version of the benefit view).  A partially contrasting  result is
given  by John  F. McDonald,  Incidence  of the Property Tax  on  Commercial  Real
Estate: The Case of Downtown Chicago, 46 Nat'l Tax J. 109  (1993),  who finds that
45%  of property  tax  differences  across  buildings were  shifted  to tenants.  But see
Joyce Y. Mann, The Incidence of Differential Commercial Property Taxes: Empirical
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between  property  taxes  and  amounts  of  capital  in a jurisdic-
tion,' 1 4 has been offered in support of the new view.
6.  Summary
Available evidence does not clearly support the benefit view,
suggesting that the new view has some relevance, particularly for
the part of the property tax that applies to structures rather than
land.  The new view does not, however, imply that benefits  do
not equal taxes.  To the extent that taxes and benefits do differ,
as  one would  expect  is true to some extent,  Part I provides  a
framework to  assess  what treatment  is  appropriate.  For con-
creteness, the present Section generally referred to the treatment
implied by the  second  benchmark:  allowing  deductions  to the
extent  that  taxes  paid  exceed  benefits  received  and requiring
inclusions to the extent that benefits exceed taxes.  But it should
be kept in mind that such treatment is not advocated  here; in-
deed, the discussion in Section I.C offers reasons for questioning
whether  any adjustment to taxable income is appropriate.
C.  Sales and Income Taxes
The analysis of state and local sales and income taxes is anal-
ogous to that of the property tax, although the relevant empiri-
cal assumptions probably differ.  To illustrate, consider  a wage
tax on workers-which is similar to an income tax for the many
taxpayers who derive most of their income from wages." 5  In the
new  view  of the  property  tax,  the  central  assumption  is  that
capital-which  is what is taxed-is perfectly  mobile.  With the
wage tax, assume similarly that labor is fully mobile."1 6
Suppose that in two jurisdictions the wage initially is $10 per
hour.  Jurisdiction  A imposes  a wage  tax of $2 per hour, and
Evidence, 48 Nat'l Tax J. 479, 480-81  (1995)  (finding most commercial property  tax
differences  to be borne by capital, not renters).
114 See Wassmer, supra note 9, at 140-52.
15  Cf. McCombs,  supra note 27, at 749 (quoted  infra  note 207)  (suggesting the
similarity  of an income tax and a sales tax given that most taxpayers spend almost all
of their income).
116 For evidence  that labor  is mobile,  and, therefore,  wages  adjust fully  for tax
differences,  see Martin Feldstein  & Marian  Vaillant,  Can State Taxes  Redistribute
Income? (National  Bureau of Economic  Research Working Paper No. 4785,  1994).
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jurisdiction B imposes no wage tax." 7  Employers in jurisdiction
A would need to raise the wage to $12 to avoid losing all their
workers to jurisdiction B.  Employers in jurisdiction A will have
a lower demand for labor when their labor costs are higher.  As
a result, the  wages  in A will fall,  and some labor will  flow to
jurisdiction B, which will reduce  the wage in B.
In equilibrium, suppose that the wages are $11  and $9 in the
two jurisdictions.  Workers would be indifferent between earning
$11  while paying  $2 in tax and earning  $9 while paying no tax.
This assumes, however, that wage earners may deduct the $2 tax
when they determine their federal taxable income.  Otherwise,
their federal  tax burden would be higher when  they  earn  $11
and pay $2 in taxes rather than simply earning $9.  (Their posi-
tion is  analogous to the landlords in Subsection  B.2.a.)
Goods and services sold in jurisdiction A will be more expen-
sive, making living there  less attractive.  (The implicit assump-
tion is that individuals must purchase goods in the jurisdiction in
which  they live,  an  assumption  that  is  relaxed  in  a moment.)
But jurisdiction A is more attractive because  the tax generates
revenue to finance public services.  On average, taxes paid will
equal benefits received." 8  Those who consume more goods and
services, however,  will pay more on account  of the tax, just as
individuals who rent larger homes paid more on account of pro-
perty taxes.  Thus, consumers-not wage earners-bear the bur-
den of the tax.  If the second benchmark treatment  is thought
appropriate, consumers should have deductions or inclusions to
the extent that the price increases they bear differ from the av-
erage borne by community members  (assuming the simple case
117 At the wage of $10,  this is a 20% tax.  The example, however, will involve wage
adjustments after imposition  of the tax; thus, if the stated tax were 20%  rather than
$2, the amount of tax paid would change  as wages change.  Although  this is indeed
how wage, income, and sales taxes  operate,  exposition is  facilitated-by  permitting
continued  use of the same, round numbers-without affecting the logic of the argu-
ment by considering a tax  that is a fixed  amount per unit of work.
118 Various individuals' taxes will differ.  Those who work 1,000 hours per year pay
$2,000  in tax and those who work 2,000 hours pay $4,000 in tax, but the wage differ-
ences make up for this (just as, with property taxes, landlords who rent larger houses
pay more tax but receive more rent).
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in which  benefits  are  equal  for  everyone). 19  (Consumers  are
analogous to the renters in Subsection B.2.b.)
Realistically,  one would not expect that labor would be per-
fectly mobile1 20 and consumption totally immobile. As examined
further in Part III, the incidence of the tax will depend on rela-
tive degrees of mobility.  Whether the tax is borne by consumers
or workers  significantly  affects  the argument  for deductibility.
(If neither consumption  nor input  suppliers had any necessary
connection  to the taxing jurisdiction, the tax might collect little
revenue as employers relocate to jurisdictions without the tax.121)
It should be clear that analysis of a sales tax is similar.  If, for
example, the tax were borne entirely by consumers in the juris-
diction, the analysis  for consumers would be  equivalent to that
just given for a wage tax borne by consumers. 22
119  Or a benefit view would be applicable  if localities  could  craft appropriate re-
strictions,  as was the  case  with  the property  tax.  See  George  R. Zodrow & Peter
Mieszkowski, The Incidence  of the Property Tax: The Benefit View Versus the New
View, in Zodrow, supra note 9, at 109,  112.
1 20 In particular, many individuals may have their residential choice constrained by
the need to live near work combined with their inability to earn the same wage in any
jurisdiction.  See,  e.g.,  Mieszkowski  & Zodrow,  supra note  9, at  1131-32;  see  also
Hamilton,  supra  note  80,  at 101-02  (discussing  constraints  on  residential  location
decisions).
121  A distinctive  aspect of property taxes  is  that they  may be borne  directly  or
indirectly, through higher rents, by residents-those  who receive benefits.  (One usu-
ally cannot benefit significantly from a jurisdiction's police and fire protection, librar-
ies, parks, and schools if one lives elsewhere.)  The only way to receive benefits  and
pay less taxes is to live in a less expensive residence,  as discussed  in Section B.  It is
not surprising, therefore, that most localities rely exclusively on the property tax, with
sales and income  taxes used by states or, occasionally,  by large metropolitan  areas.
See Henry J. Raimondo, Economics of State and Local Government 171 (1992)  (stat-
ing that localities using sales taxes are often highly urbanized counties or large cities);
id. at 186  (stating that the income  tax in most states  is imposed exclusively  by state
government  and  that local income tax levies are usually by large counties or cities);
Nechyba, supra note 73, at 138-39 (arguing that, due to migration, local property taxes
will be preferred political strategy even if voters would otherwise prefer income taxa-
tion).
Another way to focus  a tax on residents is to combine a sales tax,  a use tax, and
a sales tax exemption for out-of-state purchasers.  If such a regime is enforced, then
the tax is on residents' consumption, wherever it may be.  See generally John F. Due
& John L. Mikesell, Sales Taxation: State and Local Structure and Administration ch.
10 (2d ed. 1994)  (discussing combined  operation of sales  and use taxes).
122 There would be no effect on wages  in this instance,  so the treatment  of wage
earners does not need to be considered, as it was in the case of a wage tax.
460
HeinOnline -- 82 Va. L. Rev.  460 1996Fiscal Federalism
In  all  cases,  the  question remains  whether  taxes will  equal
benefits.  If individuals have totally free choice among a variety
of jurisdictions in which to reside-which is a different question
from whether, given their residence, they can work or consume
only locally  or at great distances-it  is likely that jurisdictions
will tend to have a homogeneous composition, with residents of
each jurisdiction  receiving benefits equal to the taxes they ulti-
mately bear  (perhaps indirectly).  To  the extent  taxes  do not
equal benefits, the question becomes whether the adjustments of
the second benchmark are appropriate.23
III.  BusINEss TAXES AND TAx INCIDENCE
This Article primarily addresses individuals' payment of state
and local taxes, the deductibility of which is controversial.  By
contrast,  it  is  generally  taken for  granted  that business  taxes
should be  deductible by the businesses that pay them.24  After
all, business  taxes are but one of many business expenses,  and
business expenses are generally deductible in computing taxable
income'25  because  net  income  rather  than  gross  revenue  is
agreed  to be the appropriate  tax base,  both to measure  accu-
rately economic well-being and to avoid distortions of economic
activity.
The deductibility of business taxes raises problems if personal
taxes  are  not  to be deductible.  One  reason  is that it can  be
difficult to determine whether a "business" tax is really a tax on
business or rather a disguised tax on individuals.  Moreover, the
incidence  of a business tax may be on the taxing jurisdiction's
consumers or workers, who receive the public goods and services
financed by the tax.  This Part addresses these issues.
A.  The Incidence of Business Taxes
Just as there is a benefit view of the property tax on housing,
there is a benefit view of taxes on business.2 6 Businesses receive
123 See supra Section I.C.
124 See, e.g.,  Vickrey, supra note 25, at 93.
l5 The statement in the text ignores that some business taxes would be capitalized
rather than deducted immediately.  See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 195,263 (1994).  This complica-
tion is irrelevant to the principles developed in the text to follow, so it will be ignored.
126 See, e.g.,  William  A. Fischel, Fiscal and  Environmental Considerations  in the
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benefits from some expenditures in a jurisdiction (such as on fire
and police protection, roads, and perhaps access to a more edu-
cated  work  force).127  Suppose  that  the  amount  of taxes  busi-
nesses pay, say, through the local property tax, just equals  the
benefits they receive.128  Then the local  tax on business  is  not
funding  residents'  benefits,  and the analysis  in the rest  of this
Article  would be unaffected. 129
The  force-mobility-that  leads  taxes  to  equal  benefits  is
similar to that in the case of individuals.  Many businesses may
be more mobile than individuals, so that the tendency for equal-
ization would be greater.  Some businesses, however, have lim-
ited  mobility.  Notably,  many  service  businesses  (restaurants,
barber shops, auto repair) and retailers (grocery stores, pharma-
cies)  need to be close to the customers  they serve. 30  In addi-
tion, all businesses need to be close enough to a workforce with
the requisite mix of skills.' 31
Location of Firms in Suburban Communities, in Fiscal Zoning and Land Use Controls
119 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975); Michelle J. White, Firm Location
in  a Zoned  Metropolitan  Area, in Mills  &  Oates,  supra,  at  175;  Mieszkowski  &
Zodrow, supra note 9, at 1109-10.
127 See William H. Oakland, How Should Businesses Be Taxed?, in State Taxation
of Business:  Issues and  Policy Options 17, 28 (Thomas F. Pogue ed., 1992).
128  If businesses impose externalities in the jurisdiction (pollution, congestion), then
taxes  may exceed direct benefits  to this extent.  A portion  of the tax would  pay for
public benefits and the remainder would pay for the costs imposed on residents.
129  There  is  also a  capitalization  version  of the  argument:  if taxes  on property
exceed the benefits provided, businesses will not locate in the jurisdiction because  of
the higher costs; if the land is, say, zoned exclusively for business use, the price of the
property will fall until the point at which the reduction in property costs to a prospec-
tive business just equals the additional tax that must be paid.  (The argument where
taxes  are less  than benefits  is analogous.)  As before, the argument  depends  upon
binding zoning and other restraints; otherwise, the incidence will be on land, which is
immobile.  See supra Subsections II.A.2 and note 84, II.B.3 and II.B.4.  For empirical
evidence  that commercial property  taxes are borne by property  owners rather than
being shifted to renters, see William C. Wheaton, The Incidence of Inter-Jurisdictional
Differences in Commercial Property Taxes, 37 Nat'l Tax J. 515 (1984). Nevertheless,
if business taxes exceed benefits to business, then individual residents' taxes on aver-
age will be less than their benefits.
130  When businesses vary in their mobility, the method by which jurisdictions com-
pete to attract business might involve a sort of price discrimination through selective
tax concessions.  That is, a general tax may apply to all businesses  (raising revenue to
fund expenditures  on residents from  immobile businesses),  with special concessions
made to attract or retain business that is mobile (effectively subjecting such businesses
only to a benefits tax).
131  For a survey of empirical research on the extent to which firm location decisions
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As with taxes on residential property, the analysis of the new
view  may be relevant.  If a business's  benefits  do not rise  in
proportion  to the value  of its property, the business  has an in-
centive to use less property than would be efficient in its opera-
tions,  and the return to  capital will fall.132  In equilibrium, the
business  will  charge  higher  prices;  the combination  of higher
prices  and factor price adjustments  (for example, lower wages)
will be such that the net return to its capital equals that in other
jurisdictions.133  More of the tax will be reflected in higher prices
to  the  extent  product  demand  is  relatively  inelastic.134  This
raises  the  question  why  consumers  would  be  willing  to  pay
higher prices.1 35  Individuals  would only do so if there were no
better alternatives, as when opportunities in low-tax jurisdictions
are too far away.
Alternatively, when prices are higher, individuals might move
their residences  to other jurisdictions.  In the scenario just de-
scribed, however, individuals  may have a reason to stay: if busi-
nesses pay taxes for public goods and services that benefit indi-
vidual residents, residents'  individual tax payments  will tend to
be less than the benefits they receive.
The compensation provided to local residents will generally be
imperfect.  First, if taxes distort local businesses'  use of capital,
are affected by taxes, see Michael Wasylenko, Has the Relationship Changed Between
Taxes and Business Location Decisions?, 1994 Proc. Nat'l Tax Ass'n 107 (1995).
132  This result assumes that there are not binding constraints on the business's use
of property.  See supra note 129.
133  Factor price adjustments need not be downward.  Consider wages.  The higher
price of capital will  lead  firms  to substitute labor for capital,  so labor demand  will
increase for any given level of output.  But the level of output will be lower because
price must be higher.  Lower output will reduce  labor demand.  Depending on  the
elasticity of demand  for output (which  determines the degree to which  output falls)
and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, the net effect could be an
increase or decrease  in the demand for labor, and thus higher or lower wages.  For a
more complete discussion of the new view with regard to the effect of a tax on mobile
capital on labor and land that is immobile, see Mieszkowski, supra note 87, at 81-90.
See also supra Subsection  II.B.4 (capitalization of property tax into land prices under
new view).
134 Wheaton,  supra  note  129,  offers  empirical  evidence  that  demand  is  almost
perfectly elastic, so that capital bears the burden.
135 Similarly, if wages  fall, see supra note  133,  there is the analogous  question of
why workers would be willing to earn lower wages.  (If wages rise, individuals paying
higher prices  may  recover  some  of the cost  through  higher  wages.)  To  facilitate
exposition, the text will consider only the effect on prices.
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there will be inefficiencies.136  As a result, the rise in prices will
be greater  than the  gain in tax revenue  because  the  efficiency
cost  must  be  compensated  to induce  capital  to  flow into  and
remain in the jurisdiction.  This factor suggests that moving away
would still offer some benefit.  Second, to the extent some con-
sumers  or workers  reside outside the jurisdiction, some of the
costs  of the tax  on business  will  be  exported.  Outsiders  will
effectively  finance  some  public  goods  and services  within  the
jurisdiction.
Whatever  the precise  degree  of compensation,  in  some  in-
stances residents will be able to finance some of their own public
sector consumption through business taxes.137  What, if any, ad-
justment in  the tax base would  best measure  ability to pay in
this  instance?  The  analysis  of different  types  of taxes in  the
following Section indicates that the answer depends on whether
the incidence is  on consumers or workers.
B.  Types of Taxes
1.  Sales Taxes
Consider  a simple sales  tax of  5%.138  Its incidence  will be
allocated  between  sellers or buyers  depending  on the  relative
elasticities of supply and demand, and its incidence will not de-
pend on whether the tax is nominally imposed on sellers or buy-
ers.  The first point is familiar:  if demand is elastic (that is,  de-
mand would change significantly in response to a given change
in price)  and  supply  is rather  inelastic  (that  is,  supply  would
change little in response to a given change in price), the tax will
be borne primarily by sellers.  Conversely, if supply is relatively
elastic, the tax will be borne primarily by buyers.
Now consider the second point.  Suppose that the sales tax is
on consumers and that, in equilibrium, they pay $100 directly to
the seller for a good and $5 to the government in tax, for a total
of $105.  If a tax reform required that the tax be paid by sellers
136  See Oates, supra note 9, at 133-35.
137 Residents also finance public consumption at others'  expense when businesses'
taxes equal benefits due to the capitalization of taxes into land prices.  See supra note
129.
138 The analysis of variants, such  as a value-added tax, would be similar.
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rather than buyers,  the  new  equilibrium  would have  a selling
price  of $105,  with  sellers  forwarding  $5  to the government.139
Putting the argument another  way, for any supply and demand
curve  one  might  draw,  shifting  down  the  demand  curve  (the
effect of a sales tax paid by buyers)  and shifting up the supply
curve  (the  effect  of a sales  tax paid  by sellers)  by  the same
amount  will  result  in the same  quantity demanded,  the same
total payment per unit by buyers, and the same net receipt per
unit by sellers.  Thus, whatever the incidence, it will not depend
on whether the sales tax is nominally imposed  on businesses  or
on individuals.
A regime  that simply eliminates  the personal  deduction  for
state  and  local  taxes  without  affecting  business  deductibility
would  allow  businesses  a deduction  if the  tax  was  nominally
imposed on business but not if the tax was nominally  imposed
on buyers.  This apparent discrepancy, however, creates no prob-
lem: the result is the same in either case.  When the tax is  on
businesses,  their  revenue  in  the  example  is  $105  rather  than
$100,  but there  is a cost of $5 that does not exist when the tax
is  on buyers.  Thus, businesses'  taxable income  is the same re-
gardless  of how the tax is  designated.  (If and only if the sales
tax is included in gross receipts do businesses  get an offsetting
deduction.)  For consumers,  they either pay the tax of $5  and
pay $100 for the good or they pay no tax but pay $105 for the
good.  When expenditures  on the good and on the tax are both
nondeductible, the result is the same.
If, however, the sales tax were deductible to individuals and
the tax was deemed to be paid by individuals-the scenario prior
to the  1986 tax reform-individuals  would  show lower taxable
income  than if a tax with identical incidence were imposed  on
business and deemed to be a business tax.  Alternatively, if one
wished to implement the second benchmark, allowing deductions
of Ti - T, that objective  would  be undermined  if the tax was
deemed to be on business.
139  If the tax were stated as the same percentage  of the gross selling price, the 5%
tax on $105  would equal  $5.25, so the equilibrium would  differ.  But that is because
the level of the tax would differ.  One can compare either the same nominal rate, 5%,
applied to the sale price net of tax, or the lower rate of about 4.76%  applied to the
gross-of-tax sale price (.0476  x $105  = $5.00).
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2.  Income and Wage Taxes
Income taxes are more common than wage taxes, but analysis
here  will  be confined  to the latter.  Wages  are the  dominant
component of most taxpayers'  income and produce most of the
revenue from income taxes,140 so most of the problem of income
taxes is covered by an analysis of wage taxes.141
The incidence of wage taxes is determined in a way analogous
to that of sales taxes.  Here, the sellers  (of labor) are workers
and the buyers are businesses.  A wage tax nominally imposed
on business  or on workers  will  have the  same incidence.  For
example, if the wage is  $10 when workers must pay a wage (or
income)  tax  of 10%-$1-for  a net, after-tax wage  of $9,  the
equilibrium  with  a  wage  tax  of $1 imposed  instead  on  firms
would involve workers receiving a wage of $9, with firms paying
$1 in tax and the workers paying no tax. 42
With a wage tax, unlike the case of a sales tax, federal income
taxes paid by individuals in a regime with no personal deduction
for state and local taxes do depend on whether the tax is nomi-
nally on business or on workers.  If the tax is on workers  (and
not deductible), workers will be subject to income tax on $10 for
each hour they work.  But if the tax is on business, they would
be taxed  on only $9  for each hour they work.  Thus, if the tax
is  nominally on business,  workers implicitly receive the benefit
of personal deductibility.  If the wage tax funds public goods and
services  that  benefit  workers  and it  is  believed  that  personal
deductibility is thus inappropriate, this circumvention would be
objectionable. 43  Alternatively,  if  the limited  deductions  and
140  See supra note 115.
141  This point is stronger for state and local taxes than for the federal  income tax
because some individuals  avoid state income  taxes  on unearned income by living  in
low- or no-income-tax jurisdictions different from where they work, but income taxes
on wages must still be paid to the higher-tax jurisdiction.  This situation raises issues
concerning  tax exporting that are addressed briefly  in Section C.
142  See  the discussion in note 139 concerning whether a business tax is imposed on
a base that is gross or net of tax.  In this instance, the comparison would involve either
a 10%  tax on wages gross of tax or an  11.1%  tax on wages net of tax.
143  See William D. Andrews, Basic Federal Income Taxation 481-82 (4th ed.  1991)
(suggesting  that nondeductibility  might lead  to  a wage  tax on  employees  being re-
placed by a tax on employers for the payment of wages).  The problem is reminiscent
of the employer's  attempt in Old Colony  Trust Co. v.  Commissioner, 279  U.S. 716
(1929).  Whether  deemed  employee  tax  payments  or  wages,  the  company  would
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inclusions  of the second benchmark were deemed  appropriate,
full de facto  deductibility would nonetheless be too generous.
To complete the analysis, note that businesses are in the same
position either way.  If the tax is nominally on workers, the busi-
ness deducts wages of $10 and nothing for the wage tax.  If the
tax is on the business, it deducts wages of $9  and tax payments
of $1.  To implement  de facto nondeductibility  by individuals,
one could include the business tax payments in taxable wages or,
as a surrogate,  deny businesses  any deduction for wage taxes.144
3.  The Incidence of Business Taxes Revisited
First, consider a property tax.1 45  In Section A, it was observed
that if capital is perfectly mobile-that is, if businesses can adjust
the amount  of property  they use-a tax on business  property
may be borne by consumers  through higher prices.  To the  ex-
tent the incidence is on consumer-residents, they purchase more
public goods by paying more for private goods.  Because private
consumption  is  not deductible,  the result with  regard to mea-
surement  of  residents'  well-being  is  similar  to  the  situation
where they pay for public goods through personal taxes (in this
case,  sales  taxes)  that  are  not deductible.  That the  business
deducts  the property  tax that funds  residents'  public benefits
does not alter this result  as long as residents indirectly bear the
tax  through  higher  prices.  (This  is  analogous  to the  case  in
which landlords deduct the property tax, but rents are higher to
reflect the public services  purchased with the tax revenue.  As
in that case, if one wished to apply the second benchmark rather
than a regime  of no deductibility, it would be necessary to im-
pute the business tax to consumers, so that those who purchase
receive a deduction.  The employer's attempt to characterize the payment as its own
(and  not on  behalf of the employee)  involved  the desire to  avoid the  need for the
employee to pay income  tax on the gross rather than the net wage.
144  If employers are in the same tax bracket  as their workers, the effect in equilib-
rium,  including federal  tax payments,  would  be  as if the tax  were  on  workers and
nondeductible to them.  Such a surrogate arrangement  could  not, however, be easily
used to implement the sorts of deductions and  inclusions required under the second
benchmark when the taxes individuals implicitly bear do not equal  the benefits they
receive.
145 A corporate income tax, as imposed by many states, is similar to a property tax:
if capital is mobile, it will not be borne by capital and will tend to be shifted to resi-
dents-workers, consumers, or owners of local land.
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more would have a greater Ti and thus a greater deduction de-
termined by Ti - T.)
It is also possible that the incidence would be on worker-resi-
dents,146 in which case the analysis in Subsection 2 indicates that
they receive  a de facto  deduction.  That businesses  deduct the
tax leads to a proper measurement of business income.  Workers
bear the tax through lower wages.  Because  wages are taxable,
the reduction  in  wages  that finances  residents'  public  services
reduces taxable income.  The situation is as if the services were
financed by a wage tax on workers that was deductible.  There-
fore,  business property  taxes,  to the  extent they provide  resi-
dents  with  benefits  that residents  implicitly  purchase  through
lower wages, entail implicit personal deductibility.
The same argument applies to sales or other taxes if the inci-
dence is on sellers rather than consumers and sellers shift the tax
to worker-residents. 147  Begin  with  a  sales  tax.  Assume  that
before the imposition of a sales tax the price of a good is $100;
after imposition of a 5%  sales tax, the price falls to $95.14  This
is the extreme  case in which  the tax is borne  entirely by busi-
ness.
Suppose that businesses do not shift this tax but instead bear
it directly.  If the  tax finances  consumer-residents'  public ser-
vices, then consumer-residents receive the benefit without paying
higher prices and without having their taxable income increased.
Using the treatment of the  second benchmark,  one could  say
that residents' Ti is zero, because they do not really bear the tax
even though they nominally pay it, and their T includes the busi-
ness  tax receipts  to  the  extent  that this tax  revenue  finances
benefits for individuals rather than for businesses.  Then Ti - T
is negative for all residents, requiring an inclusion in income  of
the difference.
146  See supra note 133.
147  Similar analysis  is  offered in Bradford  & the U.S. Treasury  Tax Policy Staff,
supra note 1, at 85, to justify the nondeductibility of sales taxes (personal deductibility
would result in a double deduction because businesses have already deducted it before
paying input suppliers)  even though  deductibility  of personal  income  taxes  is to be
permitted.
148 As before, see supra note  139, the discussion in the text assumes that tax bases
are defined  gross  or net of taxes in a matter that makes the use of round numbers
correct.  Here, the 5%  sales tax would have to be on sales gross of the tax.  Alterna-
tively, the rate on the net-of-tax base would be approximately  5.26%.
[Vol. 82:413
HeinOnline -- 82 Va. L. Rev.  468 1996Fiscal  Federalism
Is it plausible, however,  that businesses  would bear the tax
when they do not receive the benefits?  The answer is affirma-
tive if capital is immobile, in which case owners of the immobile
capital  would bear  the  tax.  But  if capital  is  mobile,  the tax
would have to be borne not by businesses but by others.  In the
stated scenario in which the tax does not raise consumer prices,
workers would bear the tax through lower wages.  This would be
like the situation described in Subsection  2 of the wage tax im-
plicitly deducted by workers,  in which worker-residents  do not
pay tax on the portion of wage income that funds publicly pro-
vided consumption.  Alternatively, if consumer-residents are the
beneficiaries,  it  might  seem  more  plausible-contrary  to  this
example's  assumption-that  they would bear the  tax through
higher  prices,  as  discussed  in  Subsection  1.  Then,  con-
sumer-residents would benefit from tax-free public consumption
only if the sales tax were  deductible.
Finally, reconsider  the wage tax.  Similar arguments can  be
used to assess who-workers, businesses, or consumers-is most
likely to bear the tax.  Similar arguments  also  can help  deter- mine the implications for deductibility and the measurement  of
ability to pay.
C.  Tax Exporting
Much  of  the  discussion  in  this  Part  involves  situations  in
which  taxes nominally  imposed  on consumers, businesses,  and
workers are borne by others, as when a business property tax is
borne by consumers and workers.  The application of the analy-
sis  to  concerns  about  the  federal  income  tax  deductibility  of
state and local taxes focused primarily on the case in which busi-
nesses, consumers,  and workers all reside in the  same jurisdic-
tion.  But businesses'  customers  and  employees  often  reside
elsewhere.  This is true particularly with regard to local jurisdic-
tions, which may be small.  In addition, when business involves
production rather than distribution, or services that may be re-
ceived  by mail  or telephone,  consumers  often reside  in  other
jurisdictions.149
149 In addition, workers  who perform some tasks are increasingly  able to  supply
their services from a distance, with the aid of computers and advances in telecommuni-
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When a jurisdiction imposes  taxes that are borne directly  by
workers or consumers or are shifted to them, and the workers or
consumers  reside elsewhere,  tax exporting  occurs.150  Outsiders
pay for local public goods and services.  As noted in Section A,
if those  goods  and  services  directly  benefit  the business,  this
result  is neither  surprising  nor problematic.  Businesses  ordi-
narily pay for inputs to production.  Prices and wages  are nor-
mally influenced by the cost of all inputs.  Moreover, the greater
the mobility of businesses, the less likely it is that jurisdictions
will impose taxes on businesses that exceed the benefits provided
to them.  If capital is mobile, such taxes must be borne by labor
or consumers.  If labor can be obtained elsewhere  and consum-
ers can be served from a distance, businesses will not be able to
pass on the cost of such taxes  unless the taxes finance benefits
to the businesses.
Nonetheless, there are limits to mobility, particularly in larger
jurisdictions.  Therefore, some tax exporting is likely to occur.'5'
This raises problems of fiscal federalism aside from the question
of deductibility of state and local taxes152  Of greatest relevance
for present  purposes is  that matching  taxes paid  and benefits
received is more complex.  Individuals will receive public bene-
fits in excess  of the taxes they pay to  their jurisdiction to the
extent some of their taxes are  exported.  Similarly, individuals
will bear  the burden  of some  taxes imposed elsewhere  that fi-
nance benefits for others.
cations.
150  See, e.g., Richard Arnott & Ronald Grieson, Optimal Fiscal Policy for a State
or Local  Government,  9  J. Urb. Econ.  23, 25-37  (1981);  Wildasin, supra note  9,  at
124-37.
151 Phares  estimates  that in 1975-1976  about  17% of state and  local taxes  were
exported to nonresidents, half of which involved the sort of exporting discussed in the
text and the other half of which arose due to deductibility on the federal income tax.
Donald  Phares, Who Pays  State and Local Taxes  ch.  4 (1980);  see also Charles  E.
McLure, Jr., The Interstate  Exporting of State and Local Taxes: Estimates  for 1962,
20 Nat'l Tax J. 49, 64-65 (1967)  (estimating that 20-25%  of state and  local taxes col-
lected  in 1962 were exported to residents of other states).
152  See, e.g., Roger H. Gordon, An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federal-
ism,  98 QJ. Econ. 567  (1983);  Daniel  Shaviro, An Economic  and Political  Look at
Federalism  in Taxation, 90 Mich.  L. Rev. 895  (1992);  Robert P. Inman  & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Designing Tax Policy in Federalist Economies: An Overview, University
of  California, Berkeley,  Program  in Law and  Economics  Working Paper  No. 93-8
(1993).
[Vol. 82:413 470
HeinOnline -- 82 Va. L. Rev.  470 1996Fiscal  Federalism
If exporting is significant, however, it hardly follows that per-
mitting deductibility would render taxable income a better mea-
sure of economic well-being.  To illustrate, consider an extreme
case  in which  there  are  only  business taxes,  which  are  borne
entirely  by workers  through  lower  wages.  Also  assume  that
there is substantial exporting  across local jurisdictions, but that
all taxes are borne within a state.  Suppose further that the ef-
fect of exporting is that all state residents pay-directly  or im-
plicitly-the  same  amount  of  local  business  taxes.  (That  is,
high-tax localities  are net exporters  of tax burden and low-tax
localities are net importers.)  Then, if one accepts the treatment
of the second benchmark,  the appropriate  deduction would  be
Ti - T, but the relevant Ti would not be the taxes  one paid di-
rectly to one's jurisdiction.  Rather, because  taxes are reflected
in  lower  wages  (everyone's  wages  are  depressed  to the  same
extent), the taxes individuals pay are already implicitly deducted.
Thus individuals would all show an inclusion equal to T, the per
capita taxes imposed by their local jurisdiction.
If, instead,  the  taxes  were  all borne  by  consumers  and  ex-
ported in a manner like that in the illustration, the relevant  Ti
would be a fraction of individuals'  consumption because this is
what consumers  pay through  higher prices  on account  of local
public services.  Observe  that in both cases  the  Ti  would not
equal the taxes  in residents' local jurisdictions, although,  as be-
fore, T would  equal the benefits received-presumed  equal to
per capita taxes collected-in residents'  local jurisdictions.
IV.  REDISTRIBUTION
A portion of state and local taxation is redistributive, as when
welfare  programs  are funded.  More  generally,  any  time that
benefits  received  do not equal taxes  paid, the  state  and local
government sector as a whole is redistributive.  Indeed, the dif-
ference  between  payments made  and benefits  received  can be
taken  as  the  definition  of redistribution.  With  pure  benefits
taxation,  individuals  all  get what  they pay  for, as  when  they
purchase privately produced goods and services.  More generally,
individuals'  tax payments can be decomposed into two compo-
nents:  (1) a benefits component  that by construction  equals the
benefits received, and (2) a redistributive component that equals
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any residual-taxes  paid minus benefits  (which would be nega-
tive for those whose benefits  exceed their payments). 1 53
Part I suggests that arguments  for  adjusting federal  taxable
income  on account  of state and local tax  payments depend  on
there  being  a  difference  between  taxes  paid  and  benefits  re-
ceived.  According to the second  benchmark,  individuals  who
pay  more get  a  deduction,  and individuals  who  receive more
have an inclusion to account for the difference.  The appropri-
ateness  of such treatment initially was stipulated and then sub-
jected to scrutiny. 54  In this Part, the basis for that result will be
examined further.  Because the  argument may depend  on the
reason redistribution  occurs, the discussion here will be divided
accordingly.  Before  exploring redistributive  motives, however,
it is useful to consider the extent of state and local redistribution
that may arise in a federal system.
A.  Limits on Local Redistribution55
In a system of totally independent jurisdictions, familiar expla-
nations for redistribution would be applicable: namely, it is be-
lieved appropriate that the rich help the poor because resources
are relatively more valuable to the latter or equality is favored
as a matter of principle.5 6  In a federal system, it is often sug-
gested that such redistribution be undertaken nationally because
the justifications for redistribution apply to all citizens  and, as a
practical matter, mobility inhibits local redistributive effort  (as
the rich leave high-tax jurisdictions and the poor enter high-wel-
fare  jurisdictions).57  Indeed,  in  the  United  States  and  many
153  See supra note 44.
154 See supra Sections  I.B and  I.C.
155 The reader is reminded  that "local"  is  used as a shorthand  for state or local,
unless otherwise specified.
156 See sources cited in note  61.
157 See, e.g.,  Musgrave  & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 454-55; Oates, supra note  9,
at  6-8,  137-40;  Helen  F. Ladd  & Fred  C.  Doolittle,  Which  Level  of Government
Should Assist the  Poor?,  35 Nat'l  Tax J. 323  (1982);  see  also David  E.  Wildasin,
Income  Redistribution  in a Common Labor Market, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 757 (1991)
(indicating  the  need, on  account of  labor mobility,  for the  central  government  to
subsidize local redistribution to an extent that makes the resulting distribution equiva-
lent to that arising under a uniform national scheme).  For evidence  on the extent to
which  local redistribution  induces migration, see Paul E. Peterson & Mark C. Rom,
Welfare  Magnets:  A New  Case  for a National  Standard ch. 3  (1990)  (arguing that
472 [Vol.  82:413
HeinOnline -- 82 Va. L. Rev.  472 19961996] Fiscal  Federalism 473
other federations, significant redistribution is undertaken nation-
ally.
Local  redistribution  requires independent  explanation.  The
magnitude  of state  and  local  redistribution  may  be  small,  in
which case there is little to explain.  For example, three-quarters
of welfare158 is  federally  funded. 59  Moreover,  some state  and
local  redistribution  might  be  induced  by  federal  matching
grants. 60
benefits induce migration and that rising poverty rates induce states to cut benefits);
Charles  C. Brown & Wallace E. Oates, Assistance  to the Poor in a Federal  System,
32 J. Pub. Econ. 307, 321-22 (1987)  (discussing empirical evidence on migration of the
poor); Dowding et al., supra note 75, at 779-84 (literature survey); Edward M. Gramli-
ch & Deborah S. Laren, Migration and Income Redistribution  Responsibilities, 19 J.
Hum.  Res.  489  (1984)  (offering  evidence  of migration  of the  poor  in response  to
welfare benefit differences); Henry W. Herzog, Jr. & Alan M. Schlottmann, State and
Local Tax Deductibility  and Metropolitan Migration, 39 Nat'l Tax J. 189 (1986)  (ex-
amining  migration  in response  to  state and  local  taxes);  Lawrence  Southwick,  Jr.,
Public Welfare  Programs  and Recipient Migration, 12  Growth  & Change 22  (1981)
(presenting evidence indicating high mobility in response to different welfare benefits);
Feldstein & Vaillant, supra note 116 (arguing that labor mobility induces wage adjust-
ments that nullify any redistributive effect of state and local taxes);  Phillip B.  Levine
& David J. Zimmerman, An Empirical Analysis of the Welfare Magnet Debate Using
the NLSY (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5264,  1995);
see also  Glenn  Cassidy,  Dennis Epple  & Thomas Romer,  Redistribution  by  Local
Governments in a Monocentric Urban Area, 19 Regional Sci. & Urb. Econ. 421 (1989)
(spatial model  with simulations).  Some  estimates suggest that legal constraints  that
would require  greater local redistribution would induce  substantial  migration.  See
Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 9, at 1727-32 (enforcing uniform residential property
assessments and equal benefits in a central city would cause most of the rich and half
of upper-middle income families  to exit).
158 Much of the discussion of data on redistribution in this Part focuses on welfare
despite the fact that any mismatch of taxes and benefits can be understood as redistri-
bution. Welfare is the most significant and obviously redistributive component of state
and local fiscal activity, and data on welfare is available.  For further discussion of the
tendency of taxes to equal the value of benefits due to adjustments in tax rules  and
the allocation  of benefits, see supra notes 77,  101,  and 102.
159 See Ladd & Doolittle, supra note 157, at 323-24 (data for 1980); Allen D. Man-
vel, Fiscal  Facts & Figures,  66 Tax Notes  1063,  1065  (1995)  (observing the "over-
whelmingly predominant role of the federal government in financing of economically
redistributive functions" through direct federal outlays and federal grants-in-aid).  The
largest component of federal aid to state and local governments, about forty percent,
is for welfare.  See Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 484; see also Frederic L.
Pryor, Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations  177 (1968)  (in most
countries surveyed, finance of welfare programs is more centralized  than public sector
as a whole,  and the federal share is at least eighty-five percent).
160 See, e.g., Robert A. Moffitt, The Effects  of Grants-in-Aid on State  and Local
Expenditures: The Case of AFDC, 23 J. Pub. Econ. 279 (1984)  (indicating that grants
significantly  affect state redistribution expenditures);  Laura S. Rubin, The State  and
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The discussion in the Sections that follow assesses the plausi-
bility  of  various  explanations  for  local  redistribution.  In  all
cases, mobility constrains how much redistribution is possible.
B.  General  Redistributive Motives
In  spite  of  these  limitations  on  subnational  redistribution,
general  redistributive  motives--concern  for  all  the  nation's
poor-might  explain  state  and local  redistribution  if state and
local  demands for redistribution exceed the amount of redistri-
bution provided by the national government.  But it seems  un-
likely that such motives do account for significant redistribution.
States-more  precisely,  their  citizens--can  engage  in national
redistribution, which tends  to be  the preferred  channel for the
reasons given previously.  As a result, if most states or localities
preferred  more  redistribution,  one would  expect  the  national
government to provide it rather than each jurisdiction engaging
in  redistribution  independently.  If general  redistributive  im-
pulses  were  at  work,  therefore,  one  would  expect  to  see
redistributive activity undertaken by only those jurisdictions with
unusually strong preferences for redistribution.161  Furthermore,
even if redistributive preferences do vary, the free-rider problem
suggests that little, if any, supplemental state and local redistri-
bution would arise.162  To be sure, some  of the cost of national
Local Government Sector:  Long-Term  Trends  and Recent  Fiscal Pressures,  78 Fed.
Res. Bull. 892, 895-97  (1992)  (stating that in the second quarter of 1992 73%  of state
and  local  transfer  payments  to  individuals  went to Medicaid  and  14%  to AFDC,
programs with significant federal matching contributions).  Deductibility itself acts as
a matching  grant.
Pending legislation might significantly change federal involvement in such redistri-
bution; if this happens, it remains to be seen whether the extent of redistribution will
fall significantly  and whether state and local redistributive efforts  will rise or fall.
161  For evidence suggesting that redistributive preferences  vary among states,  see
Larry L. Orr, Income Transfers as a Public Good: An Application  to AFDC, 66 Am.
Econ. Rev. 359  (1976).
162  To elaborate, suppose there were 10 jurisdictions of about equal size and wealth.
In a system of compulsory contributions to national redistribution-the federal income
tax-they would vote for some particular level  of redistribution.  Suppose that  one
jurisdiction favored twice as much redistribution as others, under the assumption that
the costs of the redistribution would be borne uniformly, as through an increase in the
federal income tax.  If that jurisdiction were unilaterally to increase the redistribution
it funds, it would bear the entire cost, rather than one-tenth.  Thus, it might engage
in no further redistribution.  (Its benefit is twice what others perceive but its cost when
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redistribution is externalized, but only a large  amount of exter-
nalization could explain significant redistribution due to general
redistributive motives.163
Although both the free-rider problem and constraints imposed
by mobility 64 suggest that redistribution  would be limited,  and
although Section A questions the extent to which state and local
redistribution occurs, perhaps in practice redistribution is signifi-
cant.  It remains to be considered whether existing redistribution
is best explained  by general redistributive  motives.  If it is, one
acting unilaterally  is 10 times as high, so it would find further redistribution unattrac-
tive; only if its perceived  benefit were more than 10 times as high would it act.)  Nor
could  it expect  other jurisdictions  to  follow  its lead.  Indeed,  if it  provided  more
redistribution unilaterally, the majority might vote for less redistribution at the federal
level because the total redistribution would  otherwise be higher than the preferred
level.  (That is,  the marginal benefit  of redistribution  would be less because  of the
single jurisdiction's additional redistributive activity, but the marginal cost would be
as great as before.)
The present analysis assumes that redistribution is altruistic in the sense that those
who  pay  higher  taxes  for  redistribution  are  motivated  by  the  actual  benefit  to
lower-income  recipients.  By  contrast,  recent  economic  literature  has  explored
"warm-glow"  giving, motivated  by the act of the giving in itself.  The idea is that a
wealthy individual may gain not on account of how much the poor benefit overall but
on account of a personal involvement in helping.  See, e.g., James Andreoni, Impure
Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 Econ.
J. 464 (1990).  Such motives could explain local giving beyond that which is provided
by the federal government, assuming higher-income taxpayers feel an additional warm
glow from paying additional state and local taxes for redistribution even though they
are already paying (often much greater) federal  taxes for the same purpose.
163  When a state redistributes  more, it may reduce the state's income  (by reducing
work incentives) which reduces tax payments  to the federal  government; thus, a por-
tion of the cost of further state redistribution is borne by the nation.  See William R.
Johnson, Income Redistribution in a Federal System, 78 Am. Econ. Rev. 570  (1988);
see also  McLure,  supra note  151,  at 53 (arguing that when state and local  taxes  are
shifted backward and reduce factor returns, gross income and thus federal income tax
receipts fall).  This effect, combined with current deductibility of state and local taxes,
indicates that the income tax provides a sort of matching grant that serves to increase
redistribution, above the amount produced by direct grant programs.  To this one can
add the possibility of tax exporting.  See supra Section III.C  Nonetheless,  it seems
implausible that most costs of redistribution are thereby externalized.  See supra note
151  (tax exporting, including effect of deductibility and, in the McLure study, indirect
offset  to federal  income  tax, results  in approximately  20%  of taxes exported  out of
state).  Because most  of the  benefits  of redistribution  are external,  the free-rider
problem would dominate.  Grants with high matching rates, however, might overcome
the free-rider problem sufficiently to produce significant state and local spending on
redistribution.  See supra note 160.
164  See  Wildasin, supra note 157  (stating that, with sufficient  labor mobility, the
optimal result is uniform redistribution supported by the central government, despite
different local distributive preferences).
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should  observe  jurisdictions  giving  their  funds  to the  neediest
individuals, even if they live in other jurisdictions.  But it is not
the  case,  for  example,  that New  York State  provides  welfare
benefits to poor residents of Mississippi.  While administrative
concerns provide some explanation,165 it seems doubtful that they
are sufficient to explain redistribution patterns, particularly given
the substantial disparity in the needs of the poor across jurisdic-
tions.  This suggests that other motives, explored in Sections  C
and D, may be more plausible.
Suppose, however, that redistribution  has more general (na-
tional) motivations.  Those paying  higher state and local taxes
would provide  an  external benefit to the local poor and to all
the nation's  residents.166  But a benefit  would  also  accrue  to
themselves.  Indeed, without such a benefit, individuals would
not be motivated to undertake the expenditures.  Therefore, the
well-being of those paying such taxes arguably is not reduced on
account of the redistributive benefits to others.167
The situation is like that of a collective  gift, 68  and, as Henry
Simons argued, gifts should not be deducted in determining in-
come  and,  moreover,  they  are regarded  as  income  to  recipi-
ents.169 Pursuing the analogy, it would follow that those who pay
165 It would be difficult for the New York welfare department to determine eligibil-
ity in Mississippi.  But New York could  always provide a block grant to Mississippi's
welfare  department.  It may  be concerned  that Mississippi  would then  spend  less,
although a matching formula could be devised.  (These are similar problems to those
the federal government faces in funding welfare administered by states and localities
or that states confront in giving aid to localities.)
166  Even if their motivation were solely concerned with the local public good char-
acter of redistribution,  as  explored  in Section C, there  is still  an external benefit  if
residents of other jurisdictions care about the nation's poor.
167  A contrary result may follow if the tax base is derived by measuring  expendi-
tures on preclusive  consumption, as in Andrews'  argument in favor of the charitable
contribution  deduction.  See  William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions  in an Ideal
Income  Tax,  86  Harv. L. Rev. 309,  314-15  (1972);  William  J.  Turnier, Evaluating
Personal Deductions  in an  Income Tax-The Ideal,  66 Cornell L. Rev. 262, 273-74
(1981).  As suggested throughout and discussed directly in Subsection I.C.1, the argu-
ment in the text assumes that some measure of well-being  is most relevant in deter-
mining taxable income.
168  It also would be instructive to pursue further the analogy to charitable contribu-
tions, which should be analyzed  in a manner similar to gifts.
169  See Simons, supra note 21,  ch. 6.  From the donor's perspective,  the argument
is that the donor would not have made the gift but for its production  of more utility
than the alternative of keeping  the resources for direct personal  consumption.  The
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taxes in excess of nonredistributive  benefits should have no de-
duction  on this  account, whereas  those  paying  taxes less  than
benefits should include the difference in income.170
On the other hand, efficiency considerations may favor provi-
sions that subsidize giving, which would include voluntary redis-
tribution by a local jurisdiction.171  If so, one would have to de-
termine whether a deduction for the redistributive component of
state and local taxes is the best form of subsidy (a topic pursued
argument that gifts should be viewed as income to donees is more straightforward and
less controversial.  For further  discussion, see infra note 170.
170  Some argue that gifts should be deductible in principle to donors and included
in the income of donees, with the current treatment of no deduction  and no inclusion
justified  on  administrative  grounds.  See,  e.g.,  Andrews, supra  note 167, at 348-51;
Bradford & the U.S. Treasury Tax Policy Staff, supra note 1, at 33-35.  The analogous
result is that the treatment  of the second benchmark  is appropriate  in principle, but
perhaps as a practical matter state and local taxes and benefits should be ignored.  But
the practicality problem seems  much less serious as applied to adjustments for state
and local taxes.  To illustrate, providing  the treatment of the second benchmark re-
quires only information about taxpayers' state and local tax payments and the average
payments in their jurisdiction.  (Adjustments to reflect nonuniform benefits and subtle-
ties of tax incidence complicate the story, but might be amenable  to simple formulae
that could be applied to all taxpayers in a jurisdiction.)  By contrast, implementing  a
rule that gifts are deductible  to donors and taxable to recipients would confront the
great difficulty of accounting for myriad gifts, raising administrative and enforcement
problems of identifying and characterizing countless transfers.  (Deductibility of sales
taxes raises accounting problems, but mandatory formulae could be applied given the
approximate uniformity  of sales taxes paid as a function  of jurisdiction  and income;
gifts given and received hardly have  such a uniform incidence.)
One might object that treating tax payments that fund redistribution as a form of
consumption  (and thus part of income) involves circularity because income is the base
from which federal income tax payments to finance redistribution are determined.  If
there were only a federal income tax, this would raise no problem.  (It is well-known
that  one can  redefine  uniformly  both  the base  and  rate  structure  in  an  offsetting
manner-e.g., all who earn $100,000 can be deemed to have $10,000 more income and
a larger exemption in that amount.)  In considering state and local tax payments for
redistribution from the federal perspective, it should be observed that, as explored in
the text, there will not ordinarily be significant redistribution; to the extent there is,
it will arise on account of particular local benefits or atypically strong preferences for
redistribution.  Both reasons provide a stronger ground for viewing such redistribution
as contributing to the well-being of those motivated to make the necessary  expendi-
tures.  (Of course, this entire line of argument assumes that individuals' benefits from
engaging in altruism should, for purposes  of analyzing tax obligations, be viewed as
similar  to  their benefits  from  engaging  in any  other activity.)  If redistribution  is
coercive, however, Section D suggests that the analysis  would differ.
171  Basically, the idea is that gifts  increase total utility (that of the donor and do-
nee) by an amount  greater than the benefit  to the donor (even when  the donor  is
altruistic).  See Louis  Kaplow, A  Note on  Subsidizing  Gifts,  58 J.  Pub.  Econ. 469
(1995).
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in Section VI.A).  Federal grants  already encourage  state and
local redistribution 72  The justification for subsidizing localities
rather than increasing national redistribution is unclear.73
C.  Redistribution as a Local Public Good
Redistribution, to some extent, may be a local public good.174
In other words, residents  of a jurisdiction may benefit from re-
distributing  to poorer  neighbors  independently  of any general
benefit they receive  from such redistribution  as citizens  of the
same country. There are tangible reasons for localized redistrib-
utive preferences: the poor, left unaided, may be more likely to
cause  crime  or otherwise  disrupt  others'  lives  or  may be less
productive workers in local enterprise.  In addition, individuals
may feel more strongly about the well-being of those  closer to
them; just  as  individuals  are  more  inclined  to help  family  or
friends  than  strangers,  they  may be more  favorably  disposed
toward and perhaps have more in common with those who live
nearby. 75
What, then, are the implications of locally motivated  redistri-
bution for the arguments about deductibility?  If wealthier indi-
viduals in a local jurisdiction are benefited by paying more taxes
to benefit  their poor neighbors,  as the argument  assumes, the
benefits received  by the  wealthy  are not in fact  less  than the
taxes they pay.  As a result, the argument for allowing a deduc-
tion for the difference between taxes paid and benefits received
on grounds of ability to pay fails: there is no difference. 76  The
172  See supra note  160 and accompanying text.
173  See, e.g., Oakland, supra note 36,  at 201,  206-07.
174  See Mark V. Pauly, Income Redistribution  as a Local Public Good,  2 J. Pub.
Econ. 35  (1973).  Even in this case, the amount of redistribution  will be constrained
by mobility.  See id.  at 47-56;  Brown  & Oates,  supra note  157.  Operating  in the
opposite direction is  the fact that some of the incentive or evasion  cost from higher
local taxes  to  fund  local  redistribution  is  borne  by  the federal  treasury,  so  in the
absence of mobility local governments  might redistribute more than otherwise.  See
William H. Oakland,  Income  Redistribution in a Federal  System, in Zodrow, supra
note 9, at 131,  140-43.
175  The empirical  significance of this phenomenon  may be questioned in a more
mobile society.  Wealthy residents of Chicago  suburbs may feel more connection  (if
any) to wealthy residents of New Jersey suburbs than to poor residents  of the city or
in rural areas  of Illinois.  See Ladd & Doolittle, supra note 157, at 331.
176  It would nevertheless be true that the poor would receive benefits in excess  of
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analogy made in Section B to a collective gift is applicable,  al-
though  in  this  instance  the benefit  to the donor  is  somewhat
more tangible and direct than in the case of general redistribu-
tive motives.  As in Section B, however, efficiency considerations
may justify a subsidy in some form.177
D.  Coercive Redistribution
Another possibility is that redistribution  is coercive.  That is,
individuals who pay higher taxes prefer lower taxes without re-
distribution, but they do not have the votes to prevent redistri-
bution.  Whether and how much redistribution of this sort actu-
ally occurs can be answered only through difficult inquiries that
are the subject  of positive political  theory.78  For present pur-
poses,  it should  nonetheless  be noted  that  there  are  obvious
limits  to  coercive  local redistribution.  Although  the  rich may
lack sufficient political power to prevent redistribution, it is not
clear that the poor (rather than the middle class) have the power
to  enact  it.179  Also,  recall  mobility  constraints.8 0  Such  con-
straints will be strongest at the local level in small jurisdictions,
which is consistent with the fact that most overtly redistributive
nonfederal  programs are funded by states and large cities.181
their tax payments, warranting  an inclusion under the second benchmark.
177 Section VI.A considers whether deductibility of state and local taxes (or some
variant thereof) is an effective  means of subsidy.
178 For an introductory  survey of such theories and evidence,  see Mueller,  supra
note 61, at 448-55.  For analysis of a model in which voters choose local redistribution
through property taxes despite mobility (to an  extent that tends to be greater when
there are more renters), see Dennis Epple & Thomas Romer, Mobility and Redistribu-
tion, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 828 (1991).
179  Some redistribution may be toward the middle class.  For example, state-funded
higher education  may be of relatively little benefit both to the  rich, who might send
their children to private schools, and to the poor, whose children might not attend
college.
180 See supra note 157.  Feldstein & Vaillant, supra note 116, provide evidence that
mobility causes wage adjustments that offset the redistributive effect of state and local
taxes.  They conclude that the best explanation for redistributive state and local taxa-
tion is fiscal illusion-a  failure to  appreciate the effects  of mobility--on  the part of
voters, politicians, or both.
181  More than  eighty percent of state  and local welfare expenditures  are state-fi-
nanced.  See Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 9,  at 478; see also Cassidy et al., supra
note  157  (modeling  and  providing  simulation  results  for  redistribution  by  central
cities).  If local benefits are approximately equal among citizens, the property tax is
redistributive to  the extent  housing values  vary  within  the jurisdiction.  There  are
HeinOnline -- 82 Va. L. Rev.  479 1996Virginia Law Review [Vol. 82:413
The standard arguments for deductibility-those  discussed in
connection with the second benchmark-seem best supported by
the assumption that redistribution is coercive.  In that event, it
is easiest to argue that those who pay higher taxes without re-
ceiving  direct benefits have  a lower level of well-being  on this
account.  Nonetheless,  even the limited deductions  (and inclu-
sions)  allowed  under the second  benchmark  may  be  deemed
inappropriate, as discussed in Section I.C.
V.  INTERJURISDICTIONAL  SPILLOVERS
A.  Sources
Some commentators suggest that state and local taxes should
be deductible under the federal income tax because the revenue
funds  activities that generate  benefits to other  jurisdictions.182
Redistribution  is one such activity.  Another is  education; it is
suggested  that  benefit  spillovers  arise  from  residents'  future
mobility.183  But as long  as educational benefits  are in the first
instance  embodied  in  residents'  human  capital-and  if those
residents or their parents pay for the benefit-then any positive
externalities  would be limited to benefits that are not captured
by the recipients  of education.184  Roads  and police protection
limits to mobility among jurisdictions  within the state because every locality employs
a property tax (although rates vary).  Perhaps this scheme reflects states forcing locali-
ties to redistribute, although (as  discussed in note 76)  it is not clear why a coalition
with the  political power to produce  this  result would  not favor direct state financ-
ing-or at least imposition of a state rather than a local property tax-because such
a scheme would not be subject to pressures from intrastate mobility.  See also supra
note 159  (indicating that redistribution  is funded  primarily at the federal  level).
182  See, e.g., Billman & Cunningham, supra note 6, at 1112.  The anti-deductibility
position expressed in Treasury I is defended in this regard on the ground that "[t]here
is no reason to believe  that most expenditures  of State and  local governments  have
such strong spillover effects that they would be greatly under-provided  in the absence
of the deduction for State and local taxes."  1  Treasury I, supra note 6, at 78; see also
Treasury II, supra note  6,  at 64.
183 See, e.g., Burton Weisbrod, External Benefits of Public Education (1964).  Even
in the absence of mobility, there  is  an important external benefit  generated to  the
extent education increases future earnings: those who earn more will pay more taxes
and receive less welfare.  Thus, local education may benefit state and national finances
directly.  (This argument is related to the labor-leisure distortion caused by taxation.
Individuals in choosing their degree of labor effort do not take into account the por-
tion of earnings they must pay in taxes.)
184  See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 80,  at 95.
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also provide benefits to those who pass through a jurisdiction, 85
but tolls are charged  on many interstate  highways  (particularly
those used to pass through the entire state), taxes  (notably, the
gasoline tax) fund some of these costs directly, and a significant
portion  of road  costs  are  funded  by higher  levels  of  govern-
ment. 86  Finally,  it should  be noted that  not  all  externalities
from local government activity are positive; for example, having
more roads may increase pollution.
In  sum,  the  extent  of positive  uncompensated  spillovers  is
uncertain.  Nonetheless, it will be assumed that some do exist,
raising the question of their relevance to deductibility.
B.  Relevance to Deductibility
Suppose  that  some  local  expenditures  generate  significant
positive externalities.  The argument for deductibility is like that
given for redistributive  expenditures:  if residents pay taxes but
others receive some of the benefits, the difference indicates that
ability to pay (net of consumption) is lower.  But in the case of
(noncoercive87) redistribution, it was noted that expenditures are
undertaken voluntarily and thus will be made only if the internal
1 85 For evidence that spillovers are not significant, see Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Amy
Ellen Schwartz, Spatial Productivity Spillovers  from Public Infrastructure:  Evidence
from State Highways, 2 Int'l Tax & Pub. Fin. 459 (1995).
186  The federal share for the interstate highway system is 90%  and for other roads
50%.  Richard Tresch, Public Finance 626 (1981).  And even ignoring federal aid, the
majority  of state  and local  expenditures  on  highways  are  financed  by states.  See
Musgrave  & Musgrave, supra note 9, at 478.
187 The analogy to noncoercive redistribution is appropriate.  Although some redis-
tribution may be coercive, the coercion  is done by local  voters who benefit directly.
Residents  of other jurisdictions do not coerce  local residents to build better schools
or roads than the local residents would want.
There may be coercion through activities of higher jurisdictions.  One form, match-
ing grants, does influence local decisions, but individuals are not usually worse off if
they receive bribes that lead them to choose differently.  Indeed, they are better off,
although to an extent that may be less than the value of grants received because of the
condition  that  funds  be  spent  differently  than  they  would  prefer.  See  also  supra
Subsection I.B.3 (regarding fiscal equalization).  More direct coercion arises if a higher
level of government mandates  activity that it does not fund.  Thus, if a locality would
like worse  schools but is required  by state law to pay for better ones, the difference
involves coercion.  Nonetheless, the better schools no doubt would provide benefits
to residents; their reduction in well-being would be the difference between this benefit
and the added cost.  In considering both matching grants and mandates, it should be
noted that the current Congress is considering substantial reductions in the use of such
devices.
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benefits, as perceived by the residents, at least equal the costs.
As a result, economic well-being is not lower on account of local
taxes in the presence of interjurisdictional  spillovers.
The argument with regard to spillovers from, say, highways is
more direct than that with regard to redistribution.  The sugges-
tion that redistributive expenditures do not warrant deductibility
as a matter  of income  measurement  proceeded by  analogy to
gifts,  where  the argument  in  principle  against  deductibility  is
controversial.18 8  With other  spillovers,  by contrast,  those  who
pay for the goods and services benefit directly and tangibly.  The
situation is analogous  to individuals who plant flowers in their
front  yards:  positive  externalities  are generated  for neighbors
and passers-by, but no deduction  would be appropriate in mea-
suring  economic well-being  because  there is no reason to  sup-
pose that people invest more in their gardens than is warranted
by the resulting personal benefits.
Proper income measurement  does  not, therefore, .provide a
strong foundation  for even limited  deductibility  on account  of
the existence of externalities. 189  Deductibility might instead be
188 See supra note 170.
18 9 Zelinsky argues that "[i]t  is inconsistent to deny deductibility for taxes purchas-
ing highly  generalized  public services without including  in income the value of such
services to  those who  do  not finance  them."  Zelinsky, supra note  6,  at 31.  But if
denying  deductibility does give  the correct measure  of ability to pay, it is not  clear
how improperly  allowing deductibility would somehow  offset the error of failing  to
include benefits to others in their income.  Moreover, the failure to include spillover
benefits  in the income  of other jurisdictions'  residents  may not be serious.  If, for
example,  benefits  that spill  out of one jurisdiction  spill  uniformly  into  others,  the
appropriate  income inclusion would be the same for everyone (except for those in the
funding jurisdiction,  although they  may benefit from spillovers  from other jurisdic-
tions),  so omitting such a benefit causes  little problem  for the income  tax.  (Raising
everyone's  taxable  income  the same  amount is  equivalent  to no  adjustment  and  a
downward  shift in the rate schedule.  One might still justify deductibility  of a small
fraction of state and  local taxes  as a proxy for the fact that  those who pay above-
average taxes benefit relatively less due to spillovers from others-assuming that high-
tax jurisdictions  do not tend  to be  in  proximity to  each  other, enjoying  reciprocal
spillover benefits.)  One might imagine that spillovers from, say, local educational and
redistributive expenditures are distributed more uniformly than those from individual's
gardens  (where  most benefits  may accrue  to  immediate  neighbors).  Finally, when
there are direct beneficiaries as with recipients of welfare, it is possible in principle to
tax them, and it is commonly  argued that the present failure  to do so (except in the
cases of unemployment insurance, I.R.C. § 85 (1994), and some social security benefits,
I.R.C.§ 86) involves improper income measurement.  See, e.g., Gene Steuerle, Has the
Time Come to Tax Welfare and Other Transfer Payments?, 63 Tax Notes 1365 (1994).
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justified on efficiency grounds: just as it may be efficient to sub-
sidize private activities (gardening) that produce positive extern-
alities,190 so  it may be efficient  to  encourage  local  government
activity that produces  positive externalities.  Such activity is  al-
ready encouraged directly. A significant portion of expenditures
on  welfare,  schools,  and  roads  (particularly  those  used  most
heavily  for  interjurisdictional  travel)  are  provided  by  higher
levels of government.191  In addition, more general forms of rev-
enue sharing are employed (direct grants, municipal bond inter-
est  exemption).  Higher  levels  of  government  frequently  use
funding mechanisms and mandates, often in combination; 92 in-
deed, such activities  are designed in significant part to address
interjurisdictional  spillovers.193  The remaining question is whe-
ther  federal  income  tax deductibility  is  a useful  supplemental
mechanism to address spillovers, a topic considered in the next
Part.
(Taxing the poor on welfare benefits is sometimes argued to be counterproductive, but
the tax rates remain to be specified-i.e.,  one who earns $5000 and receives  $3000 in
benefits can be taxed the same as one who earns  $8000 and receives no benefits, with
the tax owed being perhaps zero, or a negative amount indicating that further welfare
benefits  are to be provided.)
190  Coase's  analysis  emphasizes  that privately negotiated  solutions  may  address
externalities.  See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social  Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1
(1960).  With large numbers of jurisdictions-in  the tens of thousands, see Musgrave
&  Musgrave,  supra  note 9,  at 477-this  seems  unlikely.  Indeed,  higher  levels  of
government in a federal system can be understood in significant part as organizations
that serve just this  purpose of concluding  agreements  among  local jurisdictions  to
address externalities.
1 91 In 1985, the state share of state and local expenditures from their own resources
(i.e.,  ignoring grants from the federal government) for the average state was 82%  for
welfare, 53%  for elementary and secondary  education,  and  63%  for highways.  See
Musgrave  & Musgrave,  supra note  9, at 478.  The high federal  share  for welfare is
described  in note  159.  Moreover, much of the state and  local spending  may be in-
duced by federal grants.  See supra note 160.  Finally, interstate highways are funded
in large part directly by the federal government.  See supra note  186.
192 See supra note  187.
193 See  Oates,  supra  note  9,  ch.  3.  For  negative  externalities-notably,  pollu-
tion-higher jurisdictions require local jurisdictions to control their behavior.  See, e.g.,
33  U.S.C.  §§  1311-1314  (1988)  (Clean  Water  Act);  42 U.S.C.  §§ 7407-7410  (1988)
(Clean Air Act).
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VI. DEDUCTIBILITY AS A SUBSIDY
The discussion  of redistribution  in Part IV and of spillovers
more generally in Part V suggests that deductibility  may be at-
tractive because state and local government spending might oth-
erwise be lower than would be optimal from the perspective  of
the nation as a whole.  This Part considers whether deductibility
is an effective subsidy.
A.  Comparison  to Direct Subsidies
Tax expenditure analysis  offers a number of reasons why di-
rect  subsidies194  are  better  than  indirect  subsidies  provided
through  the tax system.195  First,  the use of deductibility  as  a
subsidy-that  is,  assuming  deductibility  is not  otherwise  justi-
fied-involves mismeasurement of income, which interferes with
the distributive  objectives  of the income  tax.  Thus, taxpayers
with otherwise  equal income pay different  amounts  of federal
income  tax depending  on the mix of public and private  goods
and services that they consume.
In addition, deductibility of state and local taxes is commonly
criticized  for  its  regressivity.  The  subsidy favors  high-income
individuals because deductions are worth more the higher one's
tax rate, are greater in magnitude for the rich, and are permitted
only to itemizers,  who tend to be wealthier.196  In addition, de-
ductibility  also  favors  jurisdictions  populated  by high-income
individuals  (so  that schools in  wealthy  suburbs are  subsidized
194 A common  form of subsidy in  the present  context is  a matching  grant.  For
theoretical  analyses,  see Mark Shroder, Approximately  Efficient Federal  Matching
Grants for Subnational Public  Assistance,  45 Nat'l  Tax J.  155  (1992)  (determining
matching rates that adjust for the positive externality resulting from welfare migration;
the externality arises because increasing benefits reduces the costs of welfare in neigh-
boring jurisdictions, as some of their residents exit to seek the higher benefits), and
Thomas J. Nechyba, A Computable General Equilibrium Modelof Intergovernmental
Aid  (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5420, 1996).
195 For a classic exposition  of tax expenditure  analysis,  see Stanley S.  Surrey &
Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures  (1985).
196 This latter effect is questionable because nonitemizers benefit from the standard
deduction,  the level  of which usually exceeds  the itemized  deductions  nonitemizers
would have taken if they had chosen to itemize. This suggests that there is an average
benefit to nonitemizers, all other things equal, even though there is no marginal bene-
fit.  For further comments about itemization, see notes 4 and  199.
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more than in poorer areas).197 In principle, however, this argu-
ment  is  insufficient  because  rate  adjustments  can  restore
progressivity.198  (Indeed, the repeal of sales tax deductibility  in
the 1986 tax reform and the proposed repeal of all deductibility
was explicitly accompanied by rate reductions that were greatest
for  the  rich  so  that  the  total  effect  would  be
distribution-neutral.)  The inequity that remains is produced by
income  mismeasurement:  individuals  who  receive  high deduc-
tions because they live in high-tax, high-benefit jurisdictions pay
less  tax than individuals with the  same  adjusted  gross income
who live in jurisdictions with lower taxes and benefits.
Second, deductibility is an inefficient  subsidy because it does
not target activities with significant externalities.199 Thus, a town
receives equal encouragement to finance welfare programs, fire
protection  (for which the benefits  are almost entirely local),  or
infrastructure for new industry that will generate pollution that
adversely effects neighboring jurisdictions.200
Third,  the use  of deductibility  rather  than  a direct  subsidy
arguably limits political oversight.  For example, whenever there
is general tax reform involving changes in rates and the standard
deduction, the magnitude of the subsidy changes.  This requires
adjustments  in other, more  direct  grant  programs-which  are
197  See, e.g.,  1 Treasury  I, supra note  6, at 80,  2 id.  at 64  (noting favoritism  to
high-income  individuals and high-income jurisdictions); Treasury II, supra note 6, at
62-64 (same); Bartlett, supra note 6, at 1121-22;  McLure, supra note 151, at 73-74.  As
noted in the following Section, deductibility also could increase progressivity because
it  may  encourage  states  and  localities  to adopt  more progressive  taxes  than  they
otherwise would.  Of course, Congress can take into account the incidence of state and
local taxes in setting federal income tax rates, so it is not clear that overall redistribu-
tion will be affected  by whether state and local taxes are deductible.
198  See, e.g., Griffith, Personal Deductions, supra note  11,  at 360-63.
199  See, e.g., Treasury II, supra note  6, at 64.  In addition, the provision of subsidy
through  an itemized  deduction  affects  targeting.  Ladd  suggests  that spillovers  are
probably lower in rich localities with many high-bracket itemizers and higher in poor
or mixed-income areas  (cities)  with few itemizers.  See Ladd, supra note 97, at 196.
2w Moreover, because the magnitude of the subsidy varies with income rather than
the purposes of the subsidy, further mismatches may arise.  For example, individuals
in high-income suburbs receive the greatest inducement to increase their local govern-
ment spending, but they may spend a lower fraction of their budget on programs that
produce positive spillovers than a low-income jurisdiction.  Substituting a credit for a
subsidy would tend to reduce the current disparity in the extent of the subsidy but still
would not result in a very good fit between the extent of the subsidy and the magni-
tude of external benefits produced  by a jurisdiction's public expenditures.
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under the jurisdiction of different committees from those consid-
ering the tax reform.  Also, deductibility of state and local taxes,
like other tax expenditures,  may involve reduced accountability
because  the subsidy is more opaque.201
B.  Effect of Deductibility on State and Local Spending
Deductibility affects state and local spending indirectly.  The
direct  beneficiaries  of deductibility  are taxpayers-itemizers  in
particular.  Because of the deduction, a given level of state and
local taxes or a proposed tax increase  will effectively cost them
less:  $100 of property tax costs an itemizer in the 30% bracket
only $70.  As a result, such taxpayers will favor higher taxes (or
be less  aggressive  in  demanding  lower  taxes)  than  otherwise.
The net result is that state and local  spending will be greater.
Because the effect is the greatest for high-income taxpayers,  it
is suggested that the resulting state and local taxes will be more
progressive than otherwise. 2 02
201 State and local governments may favor the subsidy on this account.  If state and
local representatives' interests were fully aligned with those of their constituents, there
would be no reason to question their views, for if all state governors successfully lobby
to retain deductibility, their constituents not only receive the benefits but also bear the
burden of higher tax rates or reduced programs that are necessary to cover the reve-
nue cost of deductibility.  One suspects,  however, that  a governor  or mayor might
believe  reelection  chances  are  greater  without repeal  because  repeal  might  bring
pressure for tax reductions from high-income voters that may be difficult to implement
without raising other taxes or cutting services, both of which may be unpopular alter-
natives.  State and local government officials were strong opponents of the attempt to
repeal deductibility as part of the 1986 tax reform.  But the revenue  savings were to
be  used entirely  to finance  reduced tax rates,  rather than being  channeled into in-
creased  grants.  Thus, the political events surrounding the 1986 reform do not provide
clear  evidence as to which form  of subsidy state and local officials  prefer.  (By con-
trast, opposition to proposals in the 1970s to substitute direct subsidies for the munici-
pal bond interest exemption  do suggest a preference  for tax-financed subsidies, per-
haps because they are less likely to be cut as part of deficit-reduction  efforts.)
20 2 See, e.g., Vickrey, supra note 25, at 95-96.  But see supra note 197 (stating that
Congress may set federal income  tax rates in light of progressivity of state and local
taxes).  For empirical evidence, see Howard  Chernick, A Model of the Distributional
Incidence of State and Local Taxes, 20 Pub. Fin. Q. 572 (1992)  (finding that deduct-
ibility increases  progressivity of state and local tax systems to such an extent that the
combined effect of deductibility on federal, state, and local systems is progressive), and
Charles  E. Scott  & Robert K. Triest, The Relationship  Between  Federal  and  State
Individual  Income Tax Progressivity,  46 Nat'l Tax J. 95  (1993)  (showing  that states
decreased  statutory  progressivity  of their  income  taxes  following  1980s  federal  tax
changes, but not to the point of avoiding an effective increase in state tax progressi-
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The empirical  significance  of this  effect  of deductibility has
been  questioned.  Taxpayers  must  perceive  the  tax  subsidy.
(Because  the  effect  is  greatest  for  high-income  itemizers,  it
seems plausible that the effect will be appreciated by many.)  In
addition,  the  taxpayers  who  benefit  from the  deduction  must
influence state  and local  tax-setting decisions.  Itemizers  are  a
minority  of taxpayers,  so it is  possible that  there would be no
effect,  although  their  number  remains  large  and  they include
most wealthy taxpayers (who may have disproportionate political
influence  due to their higher propensity  to vote  and ability to
use their wealth strategically).203  Most studies find that deduct-
ibility has a significant  effect, although the results vary.204
A further complication is that analysis of the effect of deduct-
ibility on state and local spending must take  into account that
deductibility may increase revenue raised from deductible taxes
but decrease revenue raised from other taxes.  That is, the pri-
mary effect of different deductibility rules may be to cause  sub-
stitution  among  revenue  sources  rather  than  to  change  total
expenditures.  Recent  studies  address  this  issue  and  provide
conflicting results. 205  The possibility of substitution  is particu-
larly important  with  regard  to the  1986 tax reform,  which  re-
pealed  the deductibility  of sales taxes but retained  the deduct-
ibility of income and property taxes.20 6  Because  of the potential
vity).
203 Doubt is expressed in 1 Treasury I, supra note 6, at 78-79, on the ground that
only a third of families itemize.  With regard to local rather then state taxes, itemizers
(usually homeowners with above-average income) probably are concentrated in partic-
ular jurisdictions (suburbs) so that the majority of residents in those jurisdictions may
face  a lower  effective  local  tax rate  on account  of federal  deductibility.  See, e.g.,
Ladd, supra  note 97, at  195  (finding that itemizers  in  Massachusetts  account for a
majority  of voters  in over two-thirds  of jurisdictions).  But see William  G. Hamm,
Comments, in Federal Budget Policy in the 1980s, supra note 97, at 203, 206-07 (criti-
cizing Ladd's argument that eliminating deductibility would have a significant  effect
on state and local spending).
2Treasury II, supra note 6, at 65, cites a National League of Cities study finding
that deductibility  increases state and local spending by about 2%.  Other studies find
a greater effect, ranging up to 20%.  See Bartlett, supra note 6, at 1122-23 (surveying
studies); Edward  M. Gramlich, The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes, 38 Nat'l
Tax J. 447 (1985); Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Harvey Rosen, Federal Deductibility  and
Local  Property Tax Rates,  27 J. Urb. Econ.  269  (1990)  (finding that  deductibility
increased  property tax rates  over 20%  in a sample of municipalities).
205  See sources cited supra note 3.
0 One study predicted that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 will cause a small reduc-
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importance  of substitution, many  commentators favor uniform
treatment of state and local taxes paid by individuals.207  But, to
tion in spending, half from reduction in the number of itemizers, some from the reduc-
tion in tax rates, and some from repeal of sales tax deductibility, although  the effects
of the latter will be offset by substitution.  Courant & Rubinfeld, supra note 97.  Thus
far, however, it appears  that there has been little substitution away from sales taxes.
Metcalf's  analysis  attributes  this  to a number of possible factors:  deductibility  was
incomplete because sales tax tables underestimated  and were not wholly responsive
to sales taxes paid, some sales taxes are exported, and sales taxes may affect different
income groups than other taxes; moreover, the rate reductions significantly reduced
the benefits  of the  deduction for  income  and  property taxes.  Gilbert E. Metcalf,
Deductibility and Optimal State and Local Fiscal Policy, 39 Econ. Letters 217 (1992);
Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Exporting, Federal Deductibility, and State Tax Structure, 12
J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 109 (1993); see Robert D. Ebel, Comment on "Tax Export-
ing, Federal Deductibility, and State Tax Structure," 12 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 127
(1993)  (examining Metcalf's analysis); see also Paul N. Courant & Edward M. Gram-
lich, The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on State and Local Fiscal Behavior,
in Do Taxes  Matter?  The  Economic  Effect of Tax Reform  243  (Joel Slemrod  ed.,
1990)  (analyzing the impact of the Tax Reform Act and finding little movement  in
sales taxes).  The explanation of preserving the existing distribution of tax burdens is
supported  by Robert Inman, The Local Decision to Tax: Evidence from  Large U.S.
Cities, 19 Reg. Sci. & Urb. Econ. 455 (1989), although it is unclear why state politics
would  produce  reliance  on  nondeductible  sales  taxes  rather than an  appropriately
adjusted deductible income tax.  (For example, by raising income tax rates uniformly,
including on low-income individuals, and creating or increasing preferential treatment
of unearned  income,  the adjustment  in the income tax would  have nearly the same
incidence as the sales tax.)  See Scott & Triest, supra note 202 (indicating that states
adjusted progressivity of their income taxes in response to federal tax reforms  in the
1980s).
207 See, e.g., Billman & Cunningham, supra note 6, at 1115; 1 Treasury I, supra note
6, at 80; Treasury II, supra note 6.  An earlier Treasury proposal  (1977)  advocated
different  treatment  of sales  and  income  taxes,  see  David  F. Bradford  & the U.S.
Treasury Tax Policy Staff, supra note 1, at 85, discussed in note 147, and  the analysis
in Part III indicates more generally  that superficially similar  treatment of different
taxes need not have neutral  consequences.  Turnier, supra note 167, at 275-76, 281,
294, distinguishes sales and income taxes because sales taxes are tied to consumption.
But McCombs,  supra  note  27, at 749,  aptly observes  that "[i]n  a world  where the
average individual taxpayer spends  ninety-eight percent of his earnings, there is very
little practical  difference  between  an income  tax  that takes  five percent  from  the
taxpayer as he earns it, and a sales tax that takes five percent from the taxpayer as he
spends it."  He notes that a major difference is that housing purchases and rentals are
not covered by the sales tax; the real property tax can be viewed  as a substitute.
The analysis in this Article suggests that the issue of substitution is less straightfor-
ward  than  is  often  suggested.  Suppose,  for example,  that  Congress  repealed  the
deduction for property taxes because it believed they were benefits taxes but retained
the deduction for sales and income  taxes (perhaps in modified form,  as suggested by
the second benchmark) because it believed they were redistributive.  This may encour-
age substitution of sales and income taxes for property taxes, reproducing the situation
that would exist if property  taxes were deductible  in the same manner  as sales and
income  taxes.  But, as  the analysis in Part II emphasizes,  the relationship between
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the  extent  business  taxes  would  remain  deductible  under  all
proposals, substitution remains  an issue.208
C.  Efficiency of Decisions about State and Local
Goods and Services
Deductibility also may affect the efficiency of state and local
provision  of public  goods and  services.  First,  when taxes  are
deductible,  residents do not bear the full cost of their jurisdic-
tion's public goods and services.  As a result, residents will tend
to favor greater public provision than otherwise, as discussed in
Section  B.  If provision  would  otherwise  be undistorted,  the
result might involve excessive provision of some goods and ser-
vices and inefficient production of others (as when a good more
efficiently produced in the private sector is moved to the public
sector because  purchases will then be deductible).209  But given
the  existence  of benefit  spillovers  (including  external benefits
from  redistribution),  tax exporting,  and imperfections  of local
politics, it is hardly the case that a regime with no deductibility
taxes and  benefits  is endogenous.  Property taxes may have been  nonredistributive
benefits taxes because of interjurisdictional mobility.  If mobility is great among locali-
ties but not between states, the shift to state sales and income  taxes to finance local
public services may result in a change in the relationship between taxes and benefits,
so that the substituted tax will not produce the same distribution  of tax burdens and
benefits  as the original property tax.  If the new pattern of taxes  and benefits  is the
same as the preexisting pattern for state sales and income taxes, then it may be appro-
priate to treat the substituted taxes in the same way.  The most important qualification
to this story arises from the great differences in what is currently financed by state and
local taxes.  See, e.g., supra notes 181 and  186.  As a result, even if the incidence of
any increase in sales and income  taxes is the same as that of the preexisting sales and
income taxes, the incidence of the benefits financed thereby would be different if the
increase were used to finance local public goods and services.  But see supra notes 77,
101, and 102 (incidence of taxes and benefits tends to be endogenous even taking the
type of tax as given).
208 The issue is complicated by the fact that the incidence of business taxes may fall
on consumers  or workers, as explored in Part III.
209  The importance of the latter distortion  is limited  by the ability of localities  to
contract out services.  Thus, one can  fund the services with public funds provided by
deductible taxes but still rely on competitive private sector production.  (There is the
caveat that the benefits from untaxed  imputed income  from the public capital stock
might be lost.  See Hulten & Schwab, supra note 20.)  Also, the incentive to minimize
inefficiency  in the  operation  of government  (whether  through  direct  provision  or
supervision of contractors)  is reduced to the extent a portion of the inefficiency cost
is  borne by the federal treasury rather than the jurisdiction's taxpayers.
HeinOnline -- 82 Va. L. Rev.  489 1996Virginia Law Review
is perfectly efficient.210  The direction and magnitude  of net ex-
isting  distortions  is,  however,  unclear.  (For  example,  benefit
spillovers result in inefficiently low provision of goods  and ser-
vices;21'  tax exporting  leads to excessive provision.)  Moreover,
for  reasons noted  previously,212 deductibility  is a crude instru-
ment for addressing these imperfections  even if some subsidiza-
tion is desirable.
Second, when taxes but not user charges are deductible, goods
and  services  that  could  be  priced  efficiently  are  not, causing
excessive use. 213  If the government sets the level of goods and
services available to each individual, as by rationing, the benefits
of the price system in allocating resources  are still lost.
VII.  CONCLUSION
How, if at all, federal  income tax liability should be adjusted
to reflect state and local taxes and expenditures  should be deter-
mined by concerns for proper measurement  of taxpayers'  well-
being and considerations  of efficiency.  Most of this Article fo-
cuses on the measurement of well-being.  From this perspective,
the appropriate rule depends both upon conceptual problems of
income  measurement  and upon  empirical  questions  about the
actual incidence  of state and local taxes and expenditures.
In the simplest case, in which individuals  pay taxes  equal to
the benefits they receive, no deductibility or other adjustment on
account of state and local taxes results in accurate income mea-
210 For example, Zimmerman estimates the resource misallocation due to excessive
state  and local  spending  caused  by  interstate  tax exportation  (where  exportation
caused  by federal  deductibility  is included), but concludes by noting that because of
spillovers  the  effect may be  to increase  efficiency.  Dennis  Zimmerman,  Resource
Misallocation  from Interstate Tax  Exportation:  Estimates of Excess  Spending and
Welfare Loss in a Median Voter Framework,  36 Nat'l Tax J. 183,  198-99 (1983);  see
McLure, supra note 151,  at 69-73.  Phares estimates that the combination of tax  ex-
porting, importing, and deductibility results in a net subsidy in all but one state.  See
Phares, supra note 151, at 72-82.  For a categorization of externalities among jurisdic-
tions, see Gordon, supra note 152, at 580.
211 In addition, if localities  must rely on  property taxes  and if capital is mobile,
there may be underprovision on account of "tax competition."  See, e.g., Mieszkowski
& Zodrow, supra note 9, at 1120-23; David Wildasin, Interjurisdictional Capital Mobil-
ity: Fiscal Externality  and a Corrective Subsidy, 25 J. Urb. Econ. 193  (1989); John D.
Wilson, A Theory of Interregional  Tax Competition, 19 J. Urb. Econ. 296 (1986).
212 See supra note 199.
213 See, e.g.,  1 Treasury I, supra note  6, at 80-81; Treasury  II, supra note 6, at 64.
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surement.  Convergence between individuals'  taxes and benefits
will tend to be produced by individuals'  choices of where to live
and work, the functioning  of real  estate markets,  and political
pressures on state and local jurisdictions.  Thus, there is likely to
be an important element of truth in the benefit view of taxation.
Realistically, however, economic  and political forces may al-
low for substantial divergences between taxes paid and benefits
received.  This might be viewed as warranting an adjustment in
determining federal taxable income.  It is emphasized, however,
that the most plausible  treatment  from  this perspective  is not
deductibility.  Rather, individuals might be permitted to deduct
only the difference between the taxes they pay and the average
level of benefits in their jurisdiction  (average tax payments pro-
viding a proxy for average benefits).214  Similar logic, moreover,
would require inclusions in income for those whose taxes are less
than average  benefits.  This treatment  differs from the current
system  and most reform  proposals,  and it avoids  many of the
most common objections both to deductibility215 and to the cur-
rent  exclusion  of the  benefits  financed  by  state  and  local  tax
payments.  Further  analysis,  however, raises substantial  doubts
about  whether  any  adjustments  for  state  and  local  taxes  are
conceptually appropriate, even when taxes and benefits diverge
substantially.
Whatever treatment of state and local taxes is deemed appro-
priate  in  principle,  additional  complications  arise  due  to  the
complex incidence of many such taxes.  Taxes nominally levied
on consumers  (a sales tax) might be borne by workers,  or the
converse may be true (taxes on wages-income taxes-might be
borne by consumers).  Business taxes may be shifted to consum-
ers or workers, who may reside within the jurisdiction or outside
of it.  These problems not only complicate the arguments for the
proper treatment  of personal taxes  but may also, in principle,
214  A number of refinements to this statement were developed in Section  I.B and
elsewhere.
215 For example, within a wealthy suburb where all residents itemize and are in the
same  tax bracket, there would be no net effect on total federal taxable income  in the
jurisdiction: one taxpayer's deduction would be offset by another's inclusion. The only
effect would be that those who pay more local taxes but do not receive more services
would pay less federal  income tax than those who  pay less local taxes to receive the
same services.
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require  adjustments to personal taxable  income  on account  of
business taxes.
Finally, this Article considers whether arguments  for deduct-
ibility  are  affected  by the fact  that state  and local  taxes  may
fund  income  redistribution  or  activities that generate  positive
spillovers to other regions.  The discussion casts some doubt on
the significance  of these effects, questions whether such uses of
public expenditures warrant some sort of deduction for purposes
of better measuring taxpayers' economic well-being, and suggests
that  deductibility  is  unlikely  to be  among  the most  efficient
forms of subsidy for such purposes.
In the end, familiar arguments for deductibility are unconvinc-
ing for a range of reasons, many of which differ from those usu-
ally offered to criticize current provisions.  The simplest case for
ignoring  state  and  local  taxes  in  determining  federal  taxable
income is conceptually sound but depends upon factual assump-
tions that depart (perhaps substantially) from reality.  The desir-
ability of a system without deductibility or one that uses an in-
termediate  solution of the  sort described  (but not  advocated)
herein  is contingent  on a number  of considerations  including:
whether  the  conceptual  arguments  for  some  adjustment  are
found convincing, how various theoretical  and empirical  uncer-
tainties  concerning  the incidence  of  state  and  local  taxes  are
resolved,  and  other  factors  (notably,  efficiency  considerations
and the political  feasibility  of alternatives)  not  fully explored
here.
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